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INTRODUCTION

1
23
Courts in countries as diverse as Uganda, India,
South Africa, and
4
Japan have regularly cited foreign and international law in their decisions,
particularly when in the early stages of democratic transition. Other courts, in
countries such as Taiwan and Hungary, also rely consistently on comparative
sources, but are less likely to identify them explicitly in decisions, in part
because of the way in which opinions are drafted.5 Nevertheless, their adoption
of key foreign concepts means that "the impact of foreign constitutional courts
is easy to detect in many decisions." 6
Part of the explanation for the prevalence of this comparative practice in
the democracies formed following World War II is clearly structural-their
new constitutions often explicitly incorporated international standards or
foreign-rights models into their constitutional commitments. Additionally,
many such foreign and comparative references are likely utilitarian; new courts
lacking legitimate indigenous jurisprudence may need to borrow early on to

1.
Emily Posner, Uganda Constitutional Court Research (Sept. 22, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). In 2011, we reviewed the ninety-eight electronically available
decisions of the Ugandan Constitutional Court, which serves as the intermediate court of appeals for
nonconstitutional matters and as the court of original jurisdiction for constitutional matters. See Tina
Kiiza,

Court of Appeal, THE JUDICIARY

OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

(Dec.

14, 2011),

http://www.judicature.go.ug/index.php?option=com content&task-view&id=57&Itemid=101. The court's
decisions are subject to review by the Supreme Court of Uganda. Just under half of these decisions
referenced either comparative or international law. While this measure is limited by the sample, it is
clear that the Constitutional Court regularly references these sources.
2.
Approximately one quarter of all Indian Supreme Court judgments rely on foreign or
international law, although that percentage has varied dramatically over time. In the early days of the
Court, approximately sixty-five percent of its decisions relied on foreign law, while by the 1990s,
approximately ten percent did so. Adam M. Smith, Making Itselfat Home-UnderstandingForeignLaw
in Domestic Jurisprudence:The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 218, 240 (2006).
3.
In its first three years of existence, the South African Constitutional Court cited foreign
law in more than seventy-three percent of its cases. Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in
Constitutional Interpretation: Lessons from South Africa, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 79, 90 (2010). That
percentage then declined and has not exceeded sixty percent since 1997. Nevertheless, foreign law is
still cited in almost half of the Court's most recent cases. Id.
4.

See LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN,

1970 THROUGH 1990, at 19 (1996) ("[T]he study and use of precedent, including foreign judicial
decisions (especially of U.S. and German courts) has become a common feature of judicial life."); see
also Yasuo Hasebe, ConstitutionalBorrowing and Political Theory, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 224, 235-36
(2003) (describing the process by which "[tihe Japanese Supreme Court gradually
accepted ... American doctrines" dealing with the protection of individual rights, "with some
modifications").
5.
See LASZL6 SOLYOM & GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW
DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 5 (2000) (providing examples of comparative

citation in Hungary); David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global JudicialDialogue, 86
WASH. L. REv. 523, 557-62 (2011) (discussing comparative citation in Taiwan). This is true even in
some well-established national judiciaries. See, e.g., Basil Markesinis & Jarg Fedtke, The Judge as
Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REv. I1, 28-29 (2005) (explaining that the avocats gindraux who advise
France's Cour de cassation "are nowadays expected to consult foreign law when preparing their
recommendations" even though these sources do not, for historical reasons, appear in French judicial
opinions).
S6LYOM & BRUNNER, supra note 5, at 4-5; see also Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 559
6.
(observing the same with Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence).
7.
See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International
Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707 (2006).
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speed up the decisionmaking process. Constitutional commitment, however, is
only a partial explanation, for in many of these countries the rate of use of
foreign and international law references does not seem to track directly with
constitutional requirements. In other words, engagement with foreign and
international law does not seem to vary measurably between nations based on
differences between their specific constitutional commitments. For example,
South Africa's Constitutional Court is among the courts most active in
considering the experience of other countries, even though its Constitution does
not require it to do so. 9 Similarly, the Ugandan Constitutional Court regularly
cites both foreign and international law and practice10 despite the absence of
any explicit constitutional directive.II Despite the constitutional directive to
consider international law as part of domestic law, the Namibian Supreme and
High Courts consider comparative law more frequently than international law
in some areas of their jurisprudence.12
Further undermining a purely structural explanation for the level of
citation practice is the fact that courts are frequently unclear as to how they are
considering the comparative sources.' 3 They often do not distinguish between
the level of authority accorded to ratified treaties and unratified or hortatory
instruments, for instance. Rather, courts tend to draw on a wide variety of
nonbinding foreign and international law sources that include formal
international legal instruments, the opinions of other courts, and descriptions of
the practices of other nations to support their reasoning.
The debate about the wisdom and legitimacy of this posture towards
considering foreign authority has been most heated in the United States,14

8.
The South African Court was quite explicit about this in its early decisionmaking, noting
that "[c]omparative 'bill of rights' jurisprudence will no doubt be of importance, particularly in the early
stages of the transition when there is no developed indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on
which to draw." State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 414 E, 37 (S. Aft.). In other courts, no
explanation is given for the borrowing, but the court's jurisprudence shows obvious signs of this
utilitarian focus. In 2011, we reviewed all electronically available cases from the Malawi Supreme Court
of Appeal. The Court cites foreign or international law for persuasive effect in the majority of its
electronically available cases; however, these references are commonly to the judicial process of British
and other Commonwealth courts. The Court may not consider such citation of law from the historic
colonial power as drawing upon "foreign" authority. See Johanna Kalb, Malawi Supreme Court of
Appeal (Fall 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
9.
The South African Constitution requires consideration, though not adoption, of
international law, and permits consideration of foreign law in interpreting the Bill of Rights. S. AFR.
CONST., 1996, § 39(l)(b-c).
10. Posner, supra note 1.
11. CONST. OF UGANDA, 1995, § 137.
12. Dunia P. Zongwe, Equality Has No Mothers but Sisters: The Preferencefor Comparative
Law over InternationalLaw in the Equality Jurisprudencein Namibia, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN AFRICA 123-24 (Magnus Killander ed., 2010).

13. For an account of this phenomenon in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, see
Karen Knop, Here and There: InternationalLaw in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501,
522-24 (2000).
14. For a discussion of some of the political responses to cases considering foreign authority,
see Mark Tushnet, "The Constitution Restoration Act" and JudicialIndependence: Some Observations,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1071 (2006). None of the proposed legislative initiatives went anywhere in
Congress, nor did a proposed constitutional amendment pass. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 479-82 (2009) (arguing in favor of a
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responding to the U.S. Supreme Court's recent use of these sources in resolving
a number of hotly contested decisions relating to the death penalty,15 gay
rights,' 6 affirmative action,17 and federalism.' 8 The primary substantive critique
of the practice has been that its use by the Court is antidemocratic, as these
decisions appear to be privileging the views of the "international community,"
or some subset thereof, over the preferences of this country's citizenry as
expressed through the legislative actions of their elected representatives.' 9
There are a few different variations on the antidemocratic critique, depending
on what type of international or foreign law is under study. One is that the
process by which international law is made is itself antidemocratic.20 Another is
that reliance on international law to resolve constitutional ambiguities "could
effectively result in the subordination of all domestic law" to international
standards, 21 which could (perhaps counterintuitively) weaken domestic
constitutional guarantees.22 The crux of the concern appears to be, however,
that "[t]he ability of courts to step outside of the 'four corners' of the text and
to fill an existing normative cast with contents derived from international law
sources liberates judges from the obligation to abide by the original intent of
the norm's drafters . . . [and] amplifies their law-creating role . . . ."23 In this

way, the debate over the uses of foreign authority has reinvigorated American
constitutional theory's long-standing preoccupation with the "counter-

constitutional amendment to foreclose judicial reliance on foreign law in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution).
15. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757,
762 n.70 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008).
17. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
18. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and InternationalHuman Rights
Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2009). There is also a related methodological critique, which I
discuss in more detail below. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
20. See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should InternationalLaw Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REv. 1175, 1204 (2007) (discussing the process through which customary international law
norms are identified and the difficulties inherent in changing them); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and
Constitutionalism,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2012 (2004) (discussing the politics of treaty-drafting).
21. Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive
IncorporationofHuman Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 686 (2007).
22. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources To Interpretthe Constitution, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 57, 58 (2004).
23. Yuval Shany, How Supreme Is the Supreme Law ofthe Land? ComparativeAnalysis ofthe
Influence of InternationalHuman Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by
Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 378 (2006).
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majoritarian difficulty" of judicial review,24 and has stoked the fires of the
national political conversation over the appropriateness of "judicial activism."25
Nonetheless, as the conversation has expanded beyond our borders to
include the experience of other countries' courts, the presumption as to the
antidemocratic nature of the practice has continued to frame the discussion.26
Even supporters of the practice often frame their justifications in terms of the
counter-majoritarian critique and offer solutions for resolving the democracy
deficit of foreign citation. 27 As a result, the most important comparative
discussion of foreign citation has been primarily methodological. 2 8

24. Alexander Bickel popularized the notion that judicial review poses a "counter-majoritarian
difficulty." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 17 (2d ed. 1986). He argued that when striking down the acts of elected officials as
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court "exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but
against it." Id.
25. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses ofInternationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation,98
AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (2004) ("The arguments for categorical ignorance of international law in
constitutional adjudication play on exaggerated fears: fear of foreign domination, fear of judicial
activism, fear of the unknown."); Austin L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use
of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 647 ("Citation to foreign law sources has become
synonymous with judicial activism, sometimes eliciting shrill claims of an out-of-control Court."); see
also Judicial Reliance on Foreign Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) ("Reliance on foreign law exacerbates judicial activism and empowers judges to
impose their own policy preferences from the bench."). The Heritage Foundation's Rule of Law
Initiative includes cases that cite foreign law in their database of "Cases of Judicial Activism." See
Cases of JudicialActivism, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/rule-of-law/judicial
-activism (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES I1, 13
(2003) (describing the Supreme Court of Israel as "the most activist, antidemocratic court in the world"
as demonstrated in part by its reliance on international and foreign sources); JENNIFER A. WIDNER,
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 184 (2001) (describing a trend towards international law citation in the late
1980s in eastern and southern African courts and noting the potentially antidemocratic impact of this
interpretative strategy); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of
Foreign Law, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 269 (2003) (arguing against persuasive citation of foreign authority
as antidemocratic both generally and in the Argentinian context).
27. Exemplary in this regard is Melissa Waters's comprehensive comparative study of the
nonbinding use of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the high courts
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the British Privy Council in the
Commonwealth of the Caribbean. See generally Waters, supra note 21, at 695 (arguing that courts
should evaluate "the legitimacy .. .of a given interpretive technique . . . taking into account various
factors that are unique to their nations' experience with the treaty in question and their domestic context
generally"). Based on these courts' jurisprudence, Waters diagnoses a trend of "creeping monism"
among judges and Justices in common law jurisdictions. As part of this trend, judges are "utiliz[ing]
treaties in their work despite the absence of implementing legislation giving formal domestic legal effect
to the treaties." Id. at 636. She challenges this practice across countries on the grounds that it
undermines democratic legitimacy, explaining that "[i]t is from domestic constitutional texts-not from
vague notions of a 'global judicial community'-that domestic courts obtain their legitimacy. Thus, it is
to these domestic legal sources, and not to international human rights treaties, that they owe their final
allegiance." Id. at 701. Waters concludes by suggesting that this criticism is not fatal to the practice, but
rather that common law courts may continue to draw upon unincorporated treaties, assigning them
weight based upon their domestic value, as demonstrated by external indicators of the legislative and
executive intent. Id. at 701-02. In other words, she contends that the practice requires an additional
check from the elected branches to ensure democratic legitimacy.
28. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa's
Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219 (2009); Sujit
Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law,
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The problem is that outside of the United States (and, perhaps, other wellestablished and wealthy constitutional democracies), the institutional
assumptions that underlie the counter-majoritarian critique are absent. Its core
idea-that the role of the U.S. judiciary should be limited because these are
tasks more appropriate for the legislature-does not hold in many countries
because it relies upon basic presumptions about the relative strengths,
responsibilities, and competences of different political institutions that are
simply inapplicable.2 9 Thus, the theoretical underpinning of the antidemocratic
critique of foreign citation does not translate well to the regimes in which its
use is most common.30 Given the prevalence of comparative citation in new
democracies, particularly among some of the most successful transitional
judiciaries, a full understanding of the meaning of the practice must take into
account the context in which it is adopted.
This Article reframes the question about the purpose and effect of foreign
citation as one in which meaning and methodology are intertwined within a
particular institutional context. It situates the debate about foreign citation
within the larger conversation surrounding the judicial role in democratic
transition and consolidation. Modem democratic transitions are characterized
by a tremendous degree of international influence and pressure, which
continues beyond the formal establishment of a democratic government and can
threaten the representativeness and accountability of new political institutions. I
explain the prevalence of comparative citation among the courts in transitional
democracies as in part the result of strategic behavior that aims to legitimate the
judiciary and other national institutions and to protect the domestic spaces
where democratic processes occur. As such, it may be a tool not just of judicial
autonomy and independence, but also, in some cases, of "democracy," both in
the basic sense of enabling political bodies to reflect majoritarian preferences3 1

49 UCLA L. REv. 539 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, ConstitutionalComparisons: Convergence,Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).
29. See David Landau, PoliticalInstitutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 319, 323-32 (2010) (articulating the institutional differences that undermine
the counter-majoritarian critique in developing countries).
30. Although the citation practice of all courts has not yet been empirically studied, the
existing evidence suggests that it is more common in new and weak democracies. However, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been regularly identified as one of the courts most actively engaged in
comparative judicial dialogue. See Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 532. In a study of the 402 Charter
cases the Court decided between 1998 and 2003, foreign or international law was cited in thirty-four.
See Bijon Roy, An EmpiricalSurvey of ForeignJurisprudenceand InternationalInstruments in Charter
Litigation,62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 99, 123-24 (2004). Thus, even this very active court seems to
reference foreign and international law at a relatively low rate (approximately eight percent of cases
decided).
31. See, e.g., J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 7 (1979) ("'Rule' [by
the people] means that public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or
indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which each
voter who chooses to vote counts equally . . .and in which a plurality is determinative."); ALBERT
WEALE, DEMOCRACY 14 (1999) ("[In a democracy important public decisions on questions of law and
policy depend, directly or indirectly, upon public opinion formally expressed by citizens of the
community. . . .").
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and also in the structural sense of protecting and preserving democratic
institutions. 32
Parts II and III provide a theoretical framework to explain both the role
that the judiciary may play in advancing a democratic transition and the ways
in which comparative citation can support these efforts. I begin in Part I by
considering the challenges facing the prototypical judiciary in transition and
describing how, in new and fragile democracies, courts have an important role
to play in developing the mechanisms of "horizontal accountability" 33 as
between governmental institutions, and "vertical accountability," 34 as between
the population and the national government. In other words, for the democratic
transition to be effective, courts must work to maintain the newly created
division of authority between the branches of the government while
simultaneously defining and preserving the individual rights that ensure the
accountability of that government to its people. Moreover, in many cases, the
judiciary must manage these complicated domestic relationships under the
watchful eye of the international community of foreign donors,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other powerful international
actors, who may be asserting their own pressures on domestic actors. Mediating
these multidimensional relationships creates the opportunity for courts to
engage in "diagonal accountability." 35 The network of domestic and
international relationships that often give rise to the democratic transition in the
first instance 3 then allows the judiciary to depart from formal, hierarchical
accountability paths to mobilize arguments along one axis of accountability in
support of promoting accountability along the other.
Of course, whether judges are willing and able to act as agents of
diagonal accountability depends on both their internal motivations and their
external constraints. But there is reason to believe that diagonal accountability
is of real concern to judges. Judges, like other political actors, may be
personally and professionally invested in the nation-building project. Even in
the absence of this kind of commitment, however, a strategic judge might
respond to an unstable political environment by seeking out bases of support
beyond the regime in power in order to ensure her own survival after the
transition. The strategic judge might thus be seeking ways to communicate her
value to both domestic and international audiences.

32.

See, e.g., ROBERTA. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 38, 85 (1998) (explaining that "[d]emocracy

provides opportunities for: 1. effective participation, 2. equality in voting, 3. gaining enlightened
understanding, 4. exercising final control over the agenda, [and] 5. inclusion of adults;" and that the
political institutions that are necessary to pursue these goals are "l. elected officials, 2. free, fair and
frequent elections, 3. freedom of expression, 4. alternative sources of information, 5. associational
autonomy, [and] 6. inclusive citizenship"); S.M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF
POLITICS 45 (1960) (defining democracy "as a political system which supplies regular constitutional
opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest
possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political
office").
33. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
36.

See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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As Part III explains, foreign citation offers courts a powerful tool for
signaling their fidelity to good governance to both domestic and international
actors. By limiting their own discretion and adopting widely acknowledged
international norms or foreign best practices, courts can draw attention and lend
authority to their own decisionmaking. The impact of this strategy extends
beyond simply promoting acceptance of the outcomes in particular cases.
Rather, as Part IV illustrates through a series of national examples, the strategic
and consistent use of foreign citation can work to promote the institutional
goals of diagonal accountability by allowing courts to enhance their own
legitimacy and autonomy and protect the authority of the elected branches in
the face of challenging domestic and international pressures. From a
democratic theory perspective, the use of comparative citation is thus
acceptable in that it draws on "transnational checks and balances" 37 to help
create and maintain space for the democratic deliberation necessary to validate
the authority of the new governmental structure and its institutions.
Finally, Part V concludes with reflections on how this strategic account
fits into the broader debate on both the appropriateness of foreign citation and
its proper application. Long after democracy is established, institutional failures
and international pressures may threaten the legitimacy of representative
institutions, particularly in countries at earlier stages of economic development.
II.

THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN TRANSITION

The role of the judiciary in transitional regimes has received increasing
attention in the last few decades based largely on two historical developments.
First, constitutionalism and judicial review have become increasingly pervasive
attributes of late twentieth-century political transitions, which has increased the
predominance of the judicial role in most new democratic regimes. Second, a
growing number of countries that once held democratic elections have
regressed into authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule or have simply failed to
move beyond the thin electoral definition of democracy. 39 In this historical
context, scholars have turned their focus to the role that courts can play in
helping to consolidate or solidify the post-election transition to a democratic
order.
A. DiagonalAccountability
According to Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, democratic consolidation is
complete
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular
vote, when this government defacto has the authority to generate new policies, and

37. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses ofForeign and International
Law By NationalCourts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 269 (2008).
38. See generally Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55 (1994)
(analyzing various countries that replaced authoritarian regimes with democratic governments and
discussing the transition from a democracy in name alone to a truly representative democracy).
39.

Id.
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when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy
does not have to share power with other bodies dejure.4
As is now widely acknowledged, the project of democratic consolidation
is inhibited by accountability failures in political institutions. In other words,
democracy stalls4 1 or collapses because institutional weaknesses undermine the
processes by which governmental actors are held responsible for performing
their appropriate functions. Courts can aid in democratic consolidation by
reinforcing constitutional structures of accountability across a number of
different planes.
First, a credible and autonomous judiciary may serve as an important
mechanism of horizontal accountability. "In institutionalized democracies,
accountability runs . .. horizontally across a network of relatively autonomous
powers (i.e. other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually
punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibility of a given official."42
Given the primacy of judicial review in most new regimes, courts are well
positioned to ensure that other governmental actors are subject to the
constraints of the law. An effective judiciary may thus be a key institutional
actor in preventing the reconsolidation of power in the executive that has
characterized so many nations in transition.43
Courts also play a role in vertical accountability, which can be understood
to characterize the relationship between the citizenry and the national
government. In introducing this concept, Guillermo O'Donnell focuses on the
methods by which nonstate actors in media and civil society can continue to
hold state actors to account through regular election, social mobilization, and
media oversight. 4 An effective judiciary can protect and enable these processes
of vertical accountability by ensuring governmental respect for the individual
rights that underlie them-for example, by ensuring access to the voting booth
and protecting freedom of speech and association.

40.
JUAN J. LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 3 (1996).

More simply, consolidation occurs when democracy is "the only game in town." Id. at 5. Robert Dahl's
"polyarchy" also requires not only democratic electoral conditions, but also the political institutions of
modem representative democracy. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 218 (1989).
These notions deepen the concept of democracy from earlier definitions that focused entirely on the
existence of free and fair elections as the marker of democracy.
41. A number of scholars have recognized that democracies may persist without reaching
consolidation. See, e.g., O'Donnell, supra note 38, at 56, 61-62 (defining delegative democracy as those
governments where ultra-presidentialism blocks the rule of law and other democratic institutions).
42. Id. at 61-62.
43.

See

MARINA

OTTAWAY,

DEMOCRACY

CHALLENGED:

THE

RISE

OF

SEMI-

AUTHORITARIANISM 3-4 (2003) (describing the emergence of semi-authoritarian regimes in the Soviet
successor states, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia); see also MICHAEL BRATTON
& NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC ExPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 235 (1997) (highlighting the importance of political institutions, including
the judiciary, in enabling democratic consolidation).
44. O'Donnell, supra note 38, at 55-69; see also GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, DEMOCRACY,
LAW, AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 7-36
(2001) (exploring the concept of agency as it is expressed in the legal systems of existing democracies);

Guillermo O'Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 29-30 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds.,
1999) (examining how media and a professionalized judiciary promote horizontal accountability).
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While O'Donnell's vertical axis ended with the national government, in
the democracies of the last fifty years, the notion of vertical accountability
arguably extends further to characterize the relationship between the domestic
population, the national government, and the international community, which
includes international courts, the governments of other nations, and
international NGOs. Most recent democratic transitions were in fact driven by
pressures from both internal and external constituencies, sometimes in
concert.45 For example, "[flew would question the central role played by
occupation forces in fostering democratic government in Germany and Japan
after World War II," while "the American security umbrella played a similar
facilitating function for democracy in South Korea, and Taiwan."A6 In recent
decades, international sanctions have helped to force internal political change
(perhaps most notably in South Africa), while "the export of election
monitoring technologies such as parallel vote tabulation and exit polls played a
crucial role in bringing down Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1988, unseating
Slobodan Milogevid in Serbia in 2000, and sparking the Orange Revolution in
2004."47 In each of these cases, donor funding has helped to generate and
preserve a global web of civil society groups, which has helped to inspire and
operationalize the indispensable efforts of domestic advocates during
transitions.48 Moreover, even long after the formal democratic transition has
occurred, new governments, particularly in the economically underdeveloped
countries of the Global South, continue to confront pressures from the
international community to maintain systems of democratic governance, to
protect and promote human rights, and to facilitate economic integration.
Thus, governmental actions during the transitional period and beyond are
under increased levels of scrutiny from both vertical and horizontal audiences,
which can mobilize each other in support of accountability at the national level.
The judiciary can also play a role in mediating these relationships by protecting
the domestic rights that enable these transnational connections-by protecting
access to the Internet and to international travel, for example. The ongoing
activity along both of the axes creates the opportunity for the judiciary to
engage in what we may describe as "diagonal accountability." 49 In modern

45. See generally LAURENCE WHITEHEAD,
THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF
DEMOCRATIZATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS (1996) (discussing the role of international relations

in the democratic development of states in the Americas); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D.
Ward, Difusion and the InternationalContext of Democratization, 60 INT'L ORG. 911 (2006) (arguing
that international context influences democratic transition); Jon Pevehouse, Democracy from the
Outside-In? InternationalOrganizationsand Democratization, 56 INT'L ORG. 515 (2002) (theorizing
the influence of regional international organizations on successful democratic transitions).
46. Michael McFaul, Amichai Magen & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Evaluating International
Influences on Democratic Transitions 5 (Stanford Ctr. on Democracy, Dev. & the Rule of L. Working
Paper, 2007), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2278/EvaluatingInternationalInfluences_-_Transitions ConceptPaper.pdf.
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins introduced this term to describe the potential role that
nonstate actors, such as NGOs, could play in promoting horizontal and vertical accountability. See Anne
Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Hybrid Forms ofAccountability: Citizenship Engagement in Institutionsof
Public-Sector Oversight in India, 3 PUB. MGMT. REV. 363, 368 (2001). They describe, as an example,
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regimes in transition, the judiciary must be responsive to activities on both the
vertical and horizontal axes. The challenge is in satisfying these different
audiences that are sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict. The
courts, given their responsibility for preserving the possible channels of
horizontal and vertical accountability, are uniquely positioned to manage this
overlap and can mobilize one axis "diagonally" in support of promoting
accountability along the other. Courts may draw on international support
"vertically" to protect against encroachment from the other branches
"horizontally"-for example, by reaching out to influential international
institutions to put pressure on the president to comply with judicial orders
limiting executive authority. Alternatively, courts may be well positioned to
safeguard the authority of other domestic institutions along the horizontal axis
by acting as a site of resistance against coercive international pressures-for
example, by striking down as unconstitutional domestically unpopular
legislation forced on the elected branches by international actors.
My use of the notion of "diagonalism" thus recognizes the
multidimensional channels of accountability that are available to judges in
these transitional regimes. Because the formalized mechanisms of individual
rights and separation of powers are not well established in these countries,
alternative and informal channels of communication and leverage between
domestic and international audiences may be much more effective in promoting
accountability. This Article explains how courts can use comparative citation to
engage these channels of diagonal accountability. Before turning to this
discussion, however, the next Section considers why judges might choose to
take on this role.
B.

InstitutionalEmpowerment

Whether a judiciary is able and willing to be an effective agent of
diagonal accountability depends on both internal motivation and external
constraints. As the judiciary's role in democratic transition has become more
prominent, scholars have begun to examine the behavior of judges in these
regimes in order to identify the conditions most conducive to the emergence of
independent judicial institutions. This project initially drew from the U.S.
literature exploring strategic models of judicial behavior. The strategic models

the role of public interest litigation in India to demonstrate the way in which citizens can "enter into
legal-constitutional accountability institutions to become active demanders of answerability in a forum
that carries the weight of enforceability." Id. This term has since been expanded to encompass entities
like citizen-led institutions that operate from outside the state to promote horizontal accountability. See
Mitchell O'Brien, Social Accountability-Citizens, Civil Society, and the Media Working with
Parliament to Prevent Conflict and Reduce Poverty, in WORLD BANK, PARLIAMENTS AS
PEACEBUILDERS

IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Ill

(Mitchell

O'Brien et al. eds.,

2008)

("[D]iagonal accountability ... breaks down the strict division between vertical and horizontal
accountability and augments the limited effectiveness of civil society's watchdog function by breaking
the state monopoly for executive oversight ..... ). Alternatively, it has been used to describe
administrative accountability mechanisms like ombudsmen and inspectorates that stand in no
"hierarchical relationship to public organisations and have few powers to enforce their compliance."
Marc Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 EUR. L.J.
447, 460 (2007).
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find that judicial decisionmaking is based significantly on the anticipated
reactions to those decisions by other institutional and political actors.50 The
early studies, which focused on the U.S. Supreme Court, supported the strategic
account by demonstrating that the Justices are more likely to tailor their
decisions to avoid reversals by Congress or to align their decisionmaking with
the preferences of the executive administration.
This account of judicial behavior has been challenged by Segal and
Spaeth, who adopt the "attitudinalist" approach to judicial behavior. They argue
that "institutional protections for judges and high costs in reversing judicial
decisions [mean that] judges do not need to fear the reactions of other branches.
The institutional structures of the American government effectively enable
judges to follow their 'sincere' policy preferences."52 Even if Segal and Spaeth
are correct that the presence of these institutional structures undermines the
strategic theory in the U.S. context, 53 their critique would make it more relevant
to countries in transition. The robust protections that allow U.S. judges to
decide cases without real fear are not well-established in transitional regimes:
"Protections for security of tenure are untested, extra-institutional threats to
judges' safety abound, and expectations that political actors will actually follow
judicial orders are uncertain."5 4 Thus, attention to how other actors will behave
is pressing for judges in these societies. While all judiciaries lack the power of
the sword or the purse,55 for courts in transitional democracies, this problem is
more than theoretical.
Recognizing these differences, scholars have begun to develop models of
judicial independence specifically for nondemocratic regimes. Given the lack
of real institutional protections and the potentially high cost of
noncompliance, 57 courts in these countries could reasonably be expected to

50. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Lee Epstein & Jack
Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES.
Q. 625, 628 (2000).
51.
See Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or JudicialIndependence: The
Determinants of United States Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J.
ECON. 463 (1992).
52. Peter VonDoepp, Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High
Court Behavior in Malawi and Zambia, 59 POL. RES. Q. 389, 390 (2006) (citing Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation ofPowers Games in the Positive Theory ofCongress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 28
(1997)).
53. There is considerable dispute as to whether even the U.S. Justices are so immune to
external pressures. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251 (1997) (summarizing and critiquing the
attitudinal model).
54. VonDoepp, supra note 52, at 390.
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 300 (Alexander Hamilton) (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1921).
56. Nondemocratic or "hybrid" governments are "regimes [that combine] both democratic and
authoritarian elements." Larry Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 21, 23
(2002).
57. See, e.g., FurtherAttacks upon the Judiciary in Zimbabwe Lead to Resignation of Judge,
INT'L BAR ASS'N HUM. RTS. INST., http://www.ibanet.org/Human RightsInstitute/AbouttheHRI/HRI
Activities/HRIMedia/HRIInterventions/archive/000501 _Zimbabwe.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2013)
(describing a Zimbabwean judge's resignation in response to public threat to attack him in his home);
InternationalBar Association Condemns Attacks on Judiciary,COLOMBO TELEGRAPH (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/international-bar-association-condemns-attacks-on-judiciary
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align their decisionmaking with the preferences of power-holders.
Nonetheless, the reality on the ground is far more complex, with judiciaries in
nondemocratic systems often acting in ways that limit the power of the
governing regime. A growing literature attempts to account for these
unexpectedly independent courts by identifying the incentive structures in these
regimes that would reward independent behavior.59 Most of the work in this
area has focused on the concerns that would motivate political actors to
delegate power to the courts.60 For example, even nondemocratic regimes may
value the public legitimacy that legal approval of their actions bestows.61 For
the validation of the courts to be meaningful, however, "judicial institutions
must enjoy some degree of real autonomy from the executive, and they must, at
least on occasion, strike against the expressed will of the regime."62 External
pressures may also push nondemocratic regimes to allocate power to courts.
The establishment of independent courts may be necessary to attracting muchneeded foreign direct investment or development aid.63 These structural
accounts have significant explanatory power, but they tend to center the
narrative of judicial independence on the desires of other political actors,
reflecting an underlying assumption that "courts operate in an environment of
national political constraints that compromise their own institutional legitimacy
and decisional efficacy."6
A small but growing body of work focuses more directly on the actions of
the judges themselves. Jennifer Widner argues that the incentives that political
actors have to delegate power during a constitutional transition may not ensure
their continued respect for judicial independence, particularly once it has

(reporting on the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute's response to threats and attacks
on members of the Sri Lankan judiciary); Venezuela: Stop Attacks on Judicial Independence, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/08/venezuela-stop-attacks-judicial
-independence (describing a Venezuelan judge's jailing in retaliation for her enforcement of a law
limiting pretrial detention to two years).
58. See Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
AuthoritarianPolitics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 14-

18 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6.
63. For some transitional regimes in the least developed countries (LDCs), donor support is
critical to the government's operations and thus to its survival. In Uganda, for example, foreign aid has
made up as much as thirty percent of the government budget in recent years. Haggae Matsiko, Uganda:
Donors Cut Budget Support, ALLAFRICA: INDEPENDENT (Kampala) (Aug. 9, 2010), http://allafrica.com
/stories/201008101266.html. This level of support is not uncommon among LDCs. See Rousbeh Legatis,
Translating Southern Successes into Helping Least Developed Countries:An Interview with Josephine
Ojiambo, Kenya's Ambassador to the U.N. and President of the General Assembly's High-Level
Committee on South-South Co-operation,GUARDIAN (London), May 6, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/global-development/2011/may/06/southern-successes-ldcs-josephine-ojiambo (discussing the role of
donors within African LDCs and how offering advancement and stability is important to maintaining the
forty percent of the FDI that is from foreign donors).
64. Nancy Maveety & Anke Grosskopf, "Constrained" Constitutional Courts as Conduitsfor
Democratic Consolidation, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 463, 463 (2004).
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actually been asserted. 65 She therefore proposes an important role for the judges
in "lock[ing] in" their own independence.66 In the African cases that she
discusses, judicial reformers worked to professionalize their court systems to
make their operations more accessible and more transparent to users and to the
judges themselves. This reflected the recognition, in the words of Tanzania's
Chief Justice Nyalali, that "[t]he ultimate safeguard [of judicial independence]
is really public opinion."67
Widner's account also begins to explain why a judge would be motivated
to engage in independent behavior even after it becomes clear that the regime
will no longer protect (and may even punish) insubordination. If judicial actors
are led to believe, either through historical experience or perhaps through
68
signals from the electoral process, that the dominant party's control is
tenuous, they may seek to broaden their base of support in order to ensure their
own survival when and if the regime changes. In other words, in a climate (or
in a culture) of political instability, judges may believe that it makes sense not
to put all their "eggs in the basket" of the existing government. Instead, in times
of uncertainty, judges may be able to build a more reliable base of support
external to the government by demonstrating their own neutrality and
commitment to good governance.69 Rather than trying to pick a winner, judges
may "opt for a form of behavior labeled 'strategic neutrality.' These judges
have incentives to conceal their preferences and render decisions based on legal
considerations in political cases, so that they can avoid being labeled as either
pro- or antigovernment." 70
While "strategic neutrality" was proposed as a response to political
instability, even a regime-friendly judge might adopt this strategy as a way of
perpetuating the existing power structure in which he holds a privileged
position. As others have explained, the ruling government often benefits from
the continued participation of the opposition in electoral politics.71 If the
opposition believes that there is nothing to be gained through participating in
the political process (because both elections and judicial procedures will always
be resolved in favor of the regime), it is more likely to resort to force.
Moreover, external observers of the political process, both domestically and
65.

JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALAI AND THE ROAD TO

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA 34-35 (2001).

66. Id. at 35.
67. Id. at 36 (citing Interview by Jennifer A. Widner with Francis L. Nyalali, Chief Justice,
Tanzania High Court, in Washington, D.C. (May 1995)); see also id. at 107 ("In the final analysis,
[Georges] wrote, the only real safeguard is an alert public opinion, quick to show its resentment when
restrictive measures are proposed which are not reasonably justified in a democratic society." (quoting
Philip Telford Georges, Traditionalism and Professionalism,in LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN A
ONE PARTY STATE: SELECTED SPEECHES OF TELFORD GEORGES 49 (R.W. James & F.M. Kassam eds.,
1973))).
68. See generally Jill I. Goldenzeil, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress,
Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11-12 (2013) (arguing that
when courts see opposition groups gaining power in elections, they begin to "strike bargains between
competing political interests and attempt to further their own institutional goals").
69. VonDoepp, supra note 52, at 397 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 397.
71. See Goldenzeil, supra note 68, at 1.
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internationally, may be watching the court's behavior for indications as to
whether the democratic process is functional (and therefore whether the regime
in power is worthy of support). Exercising judicial power entirely in support of
the existing regime might actually hasten its dissolution. Thus, a regimefriendly judge might engage in strategic neutrality in order to preserve the
opposition's continued participation in the constitutional system of governance,
and to assure court observers that the process is working properly.
For strategic neutrality to work, however, the judiciary must have an
audience for its "good governance" behaviors. The challenge faced by the
judiciary in many transitional democracies (particularly those that are
economically underdeveloped) is that the domestic constituency for judicial
independence is often limited or nonexistent and very difficult to build, given
weak social, legal, and technical infrastructure. Judges may be rendering fair
and well-reasoned decisions, but if the population isn't aware of or does not
understand them, they will do little to mobilize public support for the courts. In
these circumstances, judges may find it easier to communicate with and
demonstrate their value to an international audience. Furthermore, powerful
international actors like foreign donors may also be able to offer more concrete
and immediate protection from retaliation or regime change.
To summarize, this Part has presented a frame through which to
understand the challenges facing judiciaries in transition. First, in order for the
democratic transition to succeed (or at least not fail), the judiciary must
perform its accounting and legitimating functions at the intersection of the
horizontal and vertical axes because the relevant political community for their
decisionmaking extends beyond national borders. Moreover, the judges
themselves are internally motivated to engage with these foreign and domestic
audiences, as a way of separating their personal or institutional futures from the
success of the regime in power. Thus, a strategic account of judging in this
environment suggests that these courts will be looking for tools to navigate
their domestic responsibilities in a way that helps protect their own institutional
reputation and autonomy.
Through this institutional lens, the practice of comparative citation must
be reexamined. The next Part considers the use of comparative citation not in
terms of the substantive outcomes that it allows in particular cases, but rather as
a possible tool of diagonal accountability in a new regime.
III.

COMMUNICATING THROUGH FOREIGN CITATION

I have suggested that judges in new and weak democracies may adopt
judicial independence as a response to political uncertainty, and that they will
be looking for ways to communicate this commitment to a variety of internal
and external actors. This Part contends that references to international and
foreign law in a court's decisions72 can perform an important communicative

72. As others have noted, the debate over this practice has generally been characterized by
definitional imprecision. Commentators tend "to conflate foreign and international legal sources and to
treat both kinds of sources as part of a broad, vaguely defined category known as 'foreign authority."'
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function about the court's fidelity to rule of law principles. In recent decades,
constitution drafters have recognized the potency of making these
commitments, and have thus incorporated international and foreign legal norms
into the constitutive documents of new regimes. This Part explores the ways in
which courts' continued references to these norms may help to legitimate the
legal order beyond the drafting period.
A.

ConstitutionalFrameworks

As Tom Ginsburg has demonstrated, new constitutional regimes
incorporate international law norms to show internal and external precommitments to the rule of law. 73 "Constitutions [therefore] represent selfbinding acts, whereby drafters restrict the actions available to future
politicians."74 Codifying specific international norms within the constitutional
document or adopting a receptive procedural posture towards international and
foreign law within the constitutional framework demonstrates to the external
audience that the government is serious about building a legal system that
adheres to widely accepted standards for legitimate behavior. These foreign and
international law commitments serve an expressive purpose for nations
emerging from oppressive or dictatorial regimes and eager to reinvent
themselves on the international stage. For example, "Argentina borrowed in
order to manifest its adherence to the same restrictions on governmental power
that characterized the foreign and international law it adopted." 75 Several of the
post-Communist countries did so to differentiate the new order from the past
regime.
Finally, South Africa adopted its provision on foreign and
international law to rejoin the world community from which it had been
excluded during the apartheid regime.77

Waters, supra note 21, at 630; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 10-11 (2006) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court's lack of clarity on its use of these sources).
For my purposes, foreign law refers to the decisions of foreign national or international courts.
International law, by contrast, refers to international agreements like treaties or to customary
international law. I use the term "comparative citation" or "foreign citation" to refer collectively to
instances when judges and Justices rely on either foreign or on international treaty law for persuasive
effect. This generalization creates some ambiguity about what "counts," but this same ambiguity is
apparent in the way in which many judicial opinions consider these references. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
73. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International
Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707 (2006).
74. Id. at 710 (citing JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES INRATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of
Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (John Elster & Rune Stagstad eds., 1988)).

75. Rosenkrantz, supra note 26.
76. See Wictor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of ConstitutionalBorrowing, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 244,
249 (2003).
77. The Preamble to the South African Constitution makes this point explicitly, stating that the
Constitution is adopted to "[b]uild a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as
a sovereign state in the family of nations." S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl.; see also John Dugard,
InternationalLaw and the South African Constitution, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 77 (1997) (discussing the
international legal foundations of the Constitution and their role in allowing South Africa to rejoin the
international community).
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Additionally, external pressures may require conformity with particular
constitutional templates.78 In modern transitions, the inclusion of particular
constitutional ideas has been a necessary condition of independence, foreign
aid, or peace. 8 This account of the role of international and foreign law in the
drafting process recognizes that "constitution-making is framed not only by
domestic 'upstream' and 'downstream' constraints, but also by constraints of
acceptability among and anticipated reaction by other nations." 82
These constitutional precommitments also speak to domestic
constituencies. Ginsburg suggests that these constitutional provisions operate in
three ways: by committing to subject future performance to international
monitoring; by committing to pay costs for future noncompliance with
constitutional commitments; and by delegating decisionmaking authority on
particular issues to international actors.83 Each of these mechanisms permits
constitutional negotiators to delegate some control over constitutional
compliance to outsiders. Placing such "international law commitments in the
constitution may help to 'lock in' democracy domestically by giving important
interest groups more confidence in the regime."
And, because ordinary
domestic politics have been so discredited in these countries, insiders are more
willing to trust in the validity and integrity of international processes to protect
their own interests after the moment of constitutional commitment.
B.

JudicialDecisionmaking

Given the powerful commitment function that references to international
and comparative law serve at the drafting period, it makes sense that
comparative citation continues to be invoked as a tool by transitional judiciaries
even beyond what is necessitated by newer constitutional structures. Citation of
foreign authority provides these transitional judiciaries with a common
language for mediating between national and international audiences to
legitimate the new institutions of the transitioning nation in ways that loosely
follow some of its functions at the drafting stage.

78. See David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism,
99 CALIF. L. REv. 1163, 1178 (2011).
79. See CHARLES PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF
DOMESTIC

HUMAN RIGHTS

INSTRUMENTS

IN BRITAIN'S

OVERSEAS

TERRITORIES

1-19

(2007)

(discussing Britain's insistence on the inclusion of a bill of rights modeled after the European Court of
Human Rights in the post-independence constitutions of its African and Caribbean colonies).
80. See, e.g., CAROL LANCASTER, FOREIGN AID: DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, DOMESTIC
POLITICS 17, 47 (2007) (explaining that during the "third wave" of democracy, aid was provided "both
as an incentive for governments to implement political reforms and a source of financing for activities
related to democratization").
81. See Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 857-59 (2005)
(describing the conditions surrounding constitutional development in the former Yugoslavia, East
Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, post-war Germany, and post-war Japan).
82.

See VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 85

(2010) (footnote omitted).
83. See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International
Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707 (2006).
84. Id. at 712.
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First, paralleling its function of constitutional precommitment,
comparative citation may demonstrate to both internal and external audiences
the judges' willingness to commit to reasoned, legal decisionmaking. For court
systems with a reputation for corruption and abuse, reference to widely adopted
international standards may communicate that judges are willing to cabin their
discretion to outcomes that fall within broadly accepted standards of behavior.
Of course, the extent of these limitations "depends on the degree of
determinacy provided by the international body of law." 85 Open-ended
international standards may do little, as a practical matter, to define boundaries
on judicial decisionmaking. Nonetheless, their use can still communicate a
posture of self-restraint and fidelity to international "best practices" that make
other actors internally and externally more willing to accept the court's
judgments.
Related to the courts' commitment to bounded discretion and rationality
is their ability persuasively to articulate the foundations of their
decisionmaking. For courts beginning the process of building a constitutional
framework, as well as constructing the legal process in which it is embedded,
beginning the persuasive narrative presents a challenge. "Legal process"
scholars would suggest that a requirement for establishing the "[r]ule of [1]aw"
is "reasoned elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-existing
sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and responsibilities in
particular cases."8 For transitional regimes, the "recognized, pre-existing
sources of legal authority" may, out of necessity, be foreign and international
law. Beyond adopting an "originalist" approach-an orientation that may or
may not be favored in countries in transition -there is often little indigenous
jurisprudence upon which to draw for justification.
Finally, citing to parallel reasoning by more established courts may allow
for a borrowing of their perceived legitimacy by a court lacking in its own.
Like constitution drafters, courts may build confidence in the regime by
delegating some authority over decisional outcomes to external
decisionmakers. Demonstrating that a conclusion is widely adopted law in
successful democratic regimes can provide authority for reaching a similar
conclusion at home. For well-established courts in nations like South Africa,
85. JACKSON, supra note 82, at 48. ("While international human rights law may have fairly
determinate application on some issues-for example, the prohibition on torture-given the breadth of
human rights provisions and the absence of hierarchically final decision-makers to resolve the meaning
of those provisions there is considerable room for national discretion in the interpretation of these rights
and thus for indeterminacy.")
86. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997).
87. Most leading South African jurists have, for example, explicitly rejected originalism as an
interpretive basis for their country's constitutional commitments. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of
Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1, 3 (2009). In fact, as Greene has argued, despite its enthusiastic
reception in the United States, the appeal of originalism appears to have limited international reach. See
id. at 2-4.
88. In these cases, "[t]he information value of an international legal norm is not simply the
norm and reasons for it but that it is enforced as law in other countries; in other words, its 'status' as law
is relevant to the 'information' the source provides."' JACKSON, supra note 82, at 148 (footnote
omitted).
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Israel, and Taiwan whose political histories have isolated them from the
international community, judicial reference to international and comparative
law principles can help demonstrate a posture of acceptance and engagement.
David Law and Wen-Chen Chang report, based on interviews with members of
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China in Taiwan, that the Justices
are well aware of the role they play in helping "Taiwan . . . generate badly

needed support and acceptance among the international community by
following in the footsteps of powerful and prestigious countries."89 For courts
in economically developing countries, citing international and foreign law
principles may work to demonstrate competence and relevance. Moreover,
even if a court diverges from some or all of the cited international or foreign
authorities, the practice of developing and challenging domestic jurisprudence
against the framework of international law or practice creates a frame of
reference for articulating both what the new constitution is and what it is not. 90
C.

Public Relations

Beyond its direct impact on the development of the legal regime, the
practice of comparative citation may raise the prominence of the court and the
nation on the international stage. Decisions that would have been interesting
based solely on their outcomes take on increasing significance because of their
connection to international trends. 9 1 Citing foreign and international law (or
adopting parallel concepts from other jurisdictions) may draw attention to
decisions in ways that make them more likely to be of interest to foreign judges
and scholars. 92 And there are international institutions dedicated to measuring
89. Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 570.
90. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
ConstitutionalExperience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 260-61 (2001) ("Even if the reasoning of a foreign court
ultimately is rejected, explaining why it is inapplicable or wrong could improve the quality of the (U.S.
Supreme] Court's reasoning, making its choices more clear to the audience of lawyers, lower courts,
legislators and citizens.").
91.
The format of judicial opinions means that they can be more persuasive and
comprehensive than legislation, a phenomenon the recognition of which generated controversy in the
early history of the United States. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL
DEPENDENCE IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 8-9 (2009) (noting that legislators opposed case

publication on the grounds that it privileged the pronouncements of judges over legislators).
92. As Vicki Jackson explains:
References to transnational sources may relate not only to the place of the court's nation in the
community of nations, but also to the status and relationship of courts to each other in the
development of law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent courts (to
which end the display of knowledge alone may have some perceived value) and/or the
autonomous content of law under the interpretive control ofjudges.
Vicki C. Jackson, TransnationalDiscourse, Relational Authority and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality,
37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 271, 283 (2003). Scholars have noted that the jurisprudence of the Indian, South
African, and Colombian courts should and do receive increased attention and discussion due to their
extensive and innovative consideration of foreign and international law. See Bentele, supra note 28, at
265 (noting that the South African Constitutional Court's studied use of foreign law has resulted in
increasing attention to that court's decisionmaking by other foreign courts); Martha F. Davis, Public
Rights, Global Perspectives, and Common Law, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 653, 682 (2009) (suggesting
that the opinions of the South African and Colombian Constitutional Courts might be useful sources for
comparative consideration "given their leadership in adjudication involving human rights norms");
Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of JudicialActivism on Socioeconomic
Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1669, 1671-72 (2011) ("The South African Constitutional
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progress on international human rights issues, which collect and publicize court
decisions if they discuss human rights treaty instruments.93 These references
can thus operate as a sort of marketing tool to promote developments on the
ground in terms that make the judgments that incorporate them more likely to
resonate internationally. Particularly for courts in countries that, for geographic,
geopolitical, or financial reasons, may have limited opportunities to interact
personally with key international constituencies, comparative citation is a way
to speak to these audiences and increases the likelihood that they will be heard.
D.

Institution Building

To this point, I have suggested reasons why foreign citation may build
confidence in a court's decisionmaking, both internally and externally, by
linking it to well-established international norms and practices. Comparative
citation may, however, also be alienating in particular cases, particularly when
its use supports outcomes that run counter to widespread domestic practices.
For instance, in the African context, "with high levels of legal pluralism and a
limited rights culture," 94 reliance on international law norms may cause the
court to be viewed as out of step with the general population, if not with
internationally educated elites. The sensitivity may be heightened, in some
instances, by the historical experience of Western colonialism.95 Some
transitional courts seem to respond to concerns about the legitimacy of
comparative citation by borrowing international and foreign law concepts,
without specifically attributing these ideas to their origins. 96 In so doing, they

Court has also elicited international attention in judicial and scholarly circles, as demonstrated by the
interest in the court by U.S. and European scholars and the reliance on its jurisprudence in U.S. and
European constitutional theory."). See generally Arun K. Thiruvengadam, In Pursuitof "the Common
Illumination of Our House": Trans-JudicialInfluence and the Origins of PIL Jurisprudence in South
Asia, 2 INDIAN J. CONST. L. 67, 70 (2008) (arguing that the influential Public Interest Litigation
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India builds upon and contributes to the comparative judicial
dialogue).
93. Additionally, a number of NGOs maintain databases of the human rights decisions of
national courts. See Mission and Governance, INT'L NETWORK FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS.,
http://www.escr-net.org/cat/i/1372 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (collecting decisions of national courts
related to economic, social, and cultural rights); Search INTERIGHTS Website and the Commonwealth
and InternationalHuman Rights Case Law Database,INT'L CTR. FOR THE LEGAL PROT. OF HUM. RTS.,
http://www.interights.org/search/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (collecting human rights
decisions of national courts in Commonwealth countries); ICRC Databases on International
HumanitarianLaw, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.cicr.org/eng/resources/ihl-databases
/indexjsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (collecting decisions of domestic courts implementing international
humanitarian law). Additionally, through the human rights reporting processes connected to the major
United Nations treaties and the Universal Periodic Review, which provides for a holistic human rights
review of every U.N. member state, governments can highlight the judicial decisions of domestic courts
on human rights issues for national and international scrutiny.
94. Jennifer Widner, Building JudicialIndependence in Common Law Africa, in THE SELFRESTRAINING STATE, 177, 189-90 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999).
95. See Thiruvengadam, supra note 92, at 71 (2008) ("In respect of colonies, the historic
reasons favouring trans-judicial influence have been counteracted by the pressure to cast off the
imperialist past to establish strong foundations of indigenous constitutionalism.").
96. This sentiment was expressed by a Justice of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, who
stated that "it is 'harder to justify mentioning foreign law in opinions,' when 'we feel we are writing for
the country."' Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 559 (quoting Interview with Justice G., Justice of the
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may mask what they are doing domestically, while continuing to communicate
with their audiences internationally (assuming that legal experts in the nation of
origin recognize the appearance of their own legal concepts).
But even in these controversial cases, where courts act in ways that are
counter-majoritarian, comparative citation may work to legitimate the judicial
system and thus contribute to the process of democratic consolidation. As
David Law has posited: "[T]he more often that a court renders unpopular (or
unpersuasive, or unenforceable) decisions, that are nevertheless obeyed, the
greater the court's power ... may become."9 7 This observation seems like it
would be particularly true in countries in which law has historically been
subordinate to power. Observing executive or legislative compliance with
adverse court decisions is likely to do substantially more than a well-reasoned
court decision to demonstrate the power and influence of the judiciary. Of
course, courts may also undermine their legitimacy by "render[ing] decisions

that are visibly the subject of disobedience."98 The use of comparative citation
thus plays into a strategic choice that all courts face about which uses of power
reinforce and which undermine their own authority. Courts in fragile
democracies may, however, have more difficulty assessing these outcomes.
Moreover, the diagonal account suggests an additional complexity to this
narrative, in that courts may also have to take into account how external
audiences view their outcomes and authority and balance these perceptions
with those of domestic observers. And to the extent that jurists are unable to
make good guesses, following the path of comparative citation to an unpopular
outcome is a risky proposition.99
This account also suggests that there may be an interactive dynamic
between domestic courts and international and comparative law that is more
complex than in the examples previously discussed. 10 Thus far, I have argued
that international and foreign citation may lend support to domestic institutions.
In fact, the relationship may be more nuanced. Citing foreign and international
law to support "popular" outcomes may build support for the court and respect
for its authority. The court can then draw upon its own institutional legitimacy
when engaged in comparative citation in support of unpopular outcomes

Constitutional Court of the Republic of China, in Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 27, 2010). Additionally, the
stylistic norms of the Court disfavor lengthy opinions or footnotes. Id. at 558-59.
97. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 780
(2009); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 48
(1980) ("[O]ne of the surest ways to acquire power is to assert it.").
98. Law, supra note 97, at 781.
99. Even adopting domestically popular outcomes may be dangerous. The new Hungarian
Constitution explicitly limits the powers of the constitutional court on budget and tax matters, in part in
response to the Court's decisions referenced in Subsection III.B.2, infra. See also Judy Dempsey,
HungarianParliamentApproves New Constitution,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/04/19/world/europe/19iht-hungaryl9.html (explaining that curbing the Constitutional Court's
power is "[o]ne of the most disputed provisions" of the new Constitution).
100. Expanding the sample beyond new and fragile democracies further complicates the story.
While my account frames the diagonal relationship as mediating pressures from the international
community on the national regime, in other contexts, the trajectory may be reversed in countries whose
powerful national courts can influence international norms.
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without serious fear of popular reprisal.10 The strategic citation of comparative
authority may thus be self-reinforcing and self-sustaining, building support not
only for domestic courts and institutions, but also for the international norms
themselves once the court's authority as a decisionmaker is recognized.
Law's account of judicial legitimacy points to another challenge in the
practice of foreign citation. His theory of the efficacy of judicial review
depends on the court's ability to provide clear signals as to the legitimacy of
governmental behavior. One of the criticisms that has been lodged against the
practice of comparative citation is that it renders court decisions lengthier and
more difficult to comprehend due to its reliance on borrowed concepts and
norms. 102 If true, this could potentially diminish a court's "coordinating" power
by limiting its ability "to send clear and unambiguous signals."l 03 In some
cases, there may be a tension between using comparative and international law
accurately and persuasively, and preserving the communicative force of court
opinions, particularly when the court views its audience as extending beyond
the educated elites.
While potentially legitimating, therefore, comparative citation practice is
certainly not unambiguously positive. Nevertheless, the challenges posed by its
use are also not unique. Rather, they raise the same questions about the sources
of legitimacy and power that are posed by the broader project of judicial
review. The strategic account views judges as political actors, who quite selfconsciously navigate these complicated decisions, sometimes in the interests of
their own credibility and autonomy, and sometimes to further the national
governance project.
In sum, comparative citation practice offers courts a potent tool for
communicating with both domestic and international audiences about the
qualities of the court and the other institutions of the new regime. The next Part
examines the role of comparative citation as a mechanism through which the
judiciary may develop and promote the channels of diagonal accountability.
IV.

CREATING DIAGONAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH FOREIGN CITATION

Because of its signaling value, comparative citation can be exercised as a
tool of diagonal accountability to build internal and external support for new
domestic institutions in ways that protect their autonomy and ability to operate
despite the pressures of the domestic transition and globalization. Comparative
citation can thus operate on two fronts: it can legitimate the outcomes of the
particular decisions within which it appears, while communicating certain
characteristics of the new regime in ways that can help to build institutional
autonomy.
This Part examines ways in which the judiciary can invoke comparative
citation in service of diagonal accountability. Because this institutional use of

101. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
102. See Rosencrantz, supra note 26, at 292-93.
103. See Law, supra note 97, at 777.
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comparative citation operates outside the substantive outcomes in particular
cases, the connections are difficult to draw based on the reasoning in individual
cases. Moreover, as others have noted, measuring international influence by
counting citations misses the more complete picture of the ways in which
My purpose
international and foreign laws are transmitted between courts.
here is, therefore, not to offer an institutional explanation for comparative
citation as either exclusive or causal, but rather to articulate the paths through
which diagonal accountability may be operating to protect the autonomy of
challenged domestic institutions in transition.
A.

EstablishingJudicialLegitimacy and Independence

Judges are perhaps the most immediate beneficiaries of the comparative
citation practice. Referencing foreign and international law norms, as
demonstrated in the reasoning of other courts or the practice of other nations,
can help establish the credibility of the judges to both their internal and external
audiences. This is a challenge faced at some level by most new judiciaries. In
some situations, as in South Africa, members of the founding generation are
shifting from being political advocates to judicial decisionmakers. To do this
successfully, they must convince the parties in conflict that they are
"independent" and can be neutral arbiters of the cases before them.os In other
situations, there is more long-term consistency in the composition of the
bench.106 This presents its own challenge when the prior legal (or even
constitutional) regime has been discredited and the judges and Justices are
asked to legitimate themselves within a new legal framework. Relying on
comparative and foreign citation may demonstrate the neutrality of the
decisionmaking process by showing that reasoning or outcomes are consistent
with either international norms or the practice of other established democracies,
rather than with political pressures.
Creating a reputation for neutrality is only part of that process of building
judicial credibility, however. As previously discussed, judges also need to have
a base of support to protect themselves against the fallout of unpopular
decisions and to ensure that their orders are observed. Supporting its
decisionmaking with comparative citation could help a court avoid being
labeled as either pro- or antigovernment-or as aligned with a particular faction
or interests-which might help it survive fluctuations in power. Additionally,

104. See Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 533 n.33.
105. Heinz Klug has explained that in the early years of the South African Constitutional Court,
the central challenge faced by its judges was to demonstrate its ability to mediate political conflict that
might threaten violence in the absence of an established domestic jurisprudence. See HEINZ KLUG,
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLTICAL RECONSTRUCTION

157-59 (2000).
106. In Uganda, for example, the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was first appointed
to a position in the judiciary while the country was under the rule of Idi Amin. He was elevated to the
Supreme Court in 1986 shortly after Milton Obote was deposed and the National Resistance Movement
took power. In 1989, he was asked to chair the Uganda Constitutional Commission. He returned to the
Court in 1993. See, e.g., BENJAMIN J. ODOKI, THE SEARCH FOR ANATIONAL CONSENSUS: THE MAKING
OF THE 1995 UGANDA CONSTITUTION, at v-vi (2005).
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by demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law (again with reference to
international norms), judges can build a base of support domestically-but also
(along the vertical axis) with international allies, which could include judges on
other national courts, other governments, or international organizations. The
latter is a powerful constituency, which may help the court survive attacks from
the other branches.
Although the complexities of the interactions make it difficult to prove
causality, the experience of the Ugandan courts offers an example of how
courts can draw upon mechanisms of diagonal accountability to protect their
autonomy in the face of internal challenges to their independence. By
presenting themselves as committed to the rule of law, evidenced, at least in
part, through the regular citation of international and comparative law in their
decisionmaking,to7 the Ugandan courts have effectively mobilized domestic,
regional, and international NGOs, as well as donors, on their own behalf.
Perhaps the most significant recent threat to the independence of
Uganda's judiciary came in the government's response to a series of judicial
decisions rebuffing the politically motivated attempts to prosecute a key
opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, and his supporters for treason, and Besigye
himself for rape. 08 The Attorney General and the military attempted to remove
the defendants from the jurisdiction of the civilian courts by drawing on the
newly passed Antiterrorism Act for the authority to try them in a military court
martial.10 9 The case brought the executive branch and the judiciary into direct
conflict. The defendants' first bail hearing was interrupted by the arrival of
thirty armed commandos who tried to force their way into the holding cells,
resulting in an evacuation of the judges by court security.110 When reports of
the behavior of the "Black Mambas" reached the press, the government banned
media discussion of the treason, claiming that the sub judice rule precluded
public discussion of any case before the court. President Yoweri Museveni
publicly criticized the courts, accusing them of playing partisan politics by
supporting Besigye.
Despite these attacks, the Ugandan courts continued to defend their
independence with the support of both domestic and international
constituencies. Some of the judges and Justices spoke out publicly against the
attacks on the judiciary. Domestically, "[t]he Uganda Law Society (the bar
association) and the Ugandan Human Rights Commission both issued
statements critical of the government throughout the episode, publicized the
issues externally, and got people in the streets to demonstrate."'
Despite
governmental bans, several newspapers continued to write critical editorials. A
long list of international actors also weighed in.

107. See Posner,supra note 1.
108. This account is drawn primarily from Jennifer Widner & Daniel Scher, Building Judicial
Independence in Semi-Democracies: Uganda and Zimbabwe, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF
COURTS INAUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 235, 238-48 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
109. Id. at 240-42.
110. Id. at 241.
111. Id. at 246-47.
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A group of foreign envoys paid a visit to the court on the day of the first bail
hearing. They were prevented from reaching the containment cell by the Black
Mambas, but their presence sent a clear signal to the crowd. The Danish
ambassador, chief of Uganda's development partners, tried to attend the court
martial but was ordered out by the generals. The human rights groups issued reports
and monitored events closely. The International Commission on Jurists sent
representatives to monitor the trials, creating reputational pressure for the judges
and lawyers. By mid-December, the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands,
Norway, Ireland, and Britain had cut their bilateral aid programs in protest. Tony
Blair spoke publicly against the actions at the opening of the Commonwealth
Conference. The EU demanded a fair trial and expressed concern about the charges.
The U.S. State Department issued a statement expressing concern about events.112

These protests were somewhat effective. Besigye was allowed to stand
for the election and lost, although by a smaller margin than in 2001.113
Following the election, the government announced that it would comply with
the Constitutional Court's ruling that only the civilian courts could hear the
case against Besigye. The rape case was tried before Justice John Katutsi, who
ultimately acquitted Besigye and criticized the government in his judgment for
abuse of process. The treason charges continued in civilian court before a new
judge, Vincent Kagaba, who stayed the trial to permit the defense to challenge
the constitutionality of some aspects of the trial.
In October 2010, the Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed the
treason cases against Besigye and his supporters,'l4 holding that in light of the
governmental attacks on the petitioners' human rights, no subsequent
prosecution could meet the constitutional standard for a fair trial. In enjoining
the continued prosecution, the Court relied on language from the courts of
Kenya and the United Kingdom to bolster its authority:
These authorities are not binding on Uganda courts but they are highly persuasive.
The situation their Lordships were dealing with in Kenya and in Britain is very
[similar] to the situation we are dealing with in this petition. We cannot stand by
and watch prosecutions mounted and conducted in the midst of such flag[r]ant,
egregious and malafide[sic] violations of the Constitution and must act to protect
the constitutional rights of the petitioners in particular and the citizens of Uganda in
general as well as the Rule of Law in Uganda by ordering all the tainted
proceedings against the petitioners to stop forthwith ....

112. Id. at 247.
113. Besigye challenged the fairness of the election in a suit against the election commission. In
a decision characterized by Widner and Scher as "slightly reminiscent of Marbury," the Supreme Court
acknowledged widespread problems with the election, but concluded that no remedy was necessary
because the irregularities had not affected the electoral result. Id. at 245. Besigye responded to the
court's decision with a veiled threat that candidates in future elections might resort to bush struggle if
the electoral processes were not to be trusted. Id. at 245-46.
114. Anne Mugisa & Hillary Nsambu, Uganda: Col. Besigye Treason Case Dismissed,
ALLAFRICA: NEW VISION (Oct. 12, 2010), www.allafrica.com/stories/201010130033.html.
115. Besigye v. Att'y Gen., [2010] U.G.C.C. 6 (Uganda) at pt. 7 (citing Mwasia Mutua v.
Republic, (2006) Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 2004 (Kenya), http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads
FreeCases/Albanus%20v%20R%20120.04.pdf, Republic v. Karuga Karatu (Kenya), High Court
Criminal Case No. 12 of 2006, http://kenyalaw.org/DownloadsFreeCases/violation of rightspdf.pdf;
Regina v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct., [1994] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 42), available at http://www.ulii.org/ug
/judgment/constitutional-court /2010/6.
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Besigye has since been rearrested on other charges and the struggles for
accountability in Uganda continue.' Nonetheless, the judiciary in Uganda
continues to maintain its respected position as a reasonably neutral arbiter of
constitutional conflicts. Its regular reliance on international and foreign law
allows it to draw "diagonally" on sources of legitimacy and authority that
extend beyond national borders and call attention to its attempts to constrain the
overreaching acts of the executive, even in the face of threats to their personal
and institutional security. Moreover, the perceived independence of the
judiciary and the high levels of political support it enjoys internationally likely
explain why Besigye continues to challenge Museveni through the political
process," rather than by the forceful means that have characterized Uganda's
previous political transitions.118
B.

LegitimatingDomestic Institutions

While judges are perhaps the most direct beneficiaries of the legitimating
effects of comparative citation, courts may also use the practice strategically to
mediate the democratic effects of external pressures on the elected branches.
Transitional regimes, particularly those in the developing world, face
significant international pressures to adopt legal reforms that enable economic
globalization and to enforce internationally recognized human rights standards.
These pressures may conflict with domestic norms and even with domestic
constitutional protections.ll9 For newly established governments, dependent on
donor support and eager to generate economic development, these global
pressures are difficult to resist.
Additionally, the increasing prevalence of supranational courts puts
harmonization pressure on domestic courts.120 If transnational regimes provide
greater legal protections than domestic regimes, the domestic regime becomes

116. See Uganda's Kizza Besigye 'Put Under House Arrest,' BBC NEWS, May 19, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 13452143.
117. See supra note 113.
118. The experience of the Ugandan courts in drawing on diagonal accountability is not unique.
Peter VonDoepp describes similar incidents at the domestic level both in Zambia and Malawi, two other
judiciaries that have established relatively good reputations for independence in the face of political
pressure. See PETER VONDOEPP, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CASES FROM SOUTHERN

AFRICA 41-113 (2009). Freedom House assessments of judicial independence score Zambia at 4.15 and
Malawi at 4.13 in the "rule of law" category. To give some perspective on what this means, Freedom
House groups these countries in the same category with much more economically developed nations like
South Africa (4.28), Argentina (4.18), and Brazil (4.06). Jake Dizard et al., Countries at the Crossroads
2010: An Analysis ofDemocratic Governance, FREEDOM HOUSE (2010), http://www.freedomhouse.org
/report/countries-crossroads/countries-crossroads-2010. While neither court is particularly innovative in
its use of foreign and comparative law, their decisions are usually permeated with citations to other
Commonwealth countries. Only rarely are these decisions described as foreign.
119. For example:
In Colombia, the Philippines, and Mexico constitutional provisions for the protection of
national resources and control over resources have come under challenge when they are seen
to obstruct economic globalization. Courts in some of these countries have relied on particular
provisions of national constitutions to resist certain foreign investment, privatization, or
foreign or transnational standards of compensation that differ from the domestic rule.
JACKSON, supra note 82, at 36.
120. David S. Law, Generic ConstitutionalLaw, 89 MINN. L. REv. 652, 715 (2005).
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irrelevant.121 This observation applies with even greater force to the legal
regimes of new democracies, which generally lack a presumption of relevance
to begin with. Providing protections lower than could be achieved through
international adjudication undermines investment in the new legal regime for
insiders and outsiders. It can also set the country up for embarrassing or costly
losses in international or regional human rights courts, or in international
investment disputes (for example, if property protection regimes do not match
international standards for expropriation).
On the flip-side, adopting unpopular legislation to meet the demands of
international harmonization pressures can undermine the credibility of these
new, elected institutions with the voters. The elected branches thus face
something of a "Catch-22," in that the actions they must take to satisfy
powerful international constituencies may directly threaten their domestic
political survival. The judiciary can help mediate these conflicts through the
language of comparative citation.
1.

ForeignCitation as Acceptance

By relying on foreign citation in constitutional interpretation, courts may
give politically challenging legislative acts a stamp of domestic legitimacy by
demonstrating that international principles are constitutionally embedded.
Lending its constitutional approval to "controversial, national legislation made
under conditions of international influence, the constitutional court [can]
settle[] political conflict over legislative policy in a national way."1 22 In other
words, by making the explicit connection between international norms and
domestic constitutional principles, the courts can provide cover for the political
branches engaged in internationally defined democratic reforms.
This observation builds on the work of Nancy Maveety and Anke
Grosskopf, who proposed this theory of the judicial role in the context of
deeply disputed minority-language protections in Estonia. The 1992 Estonian
Constitution guarantees protection for minority rights and separately grants
noncitizens the right to vote in municipal elections. Nonetheless, in the mid1990s, the Estonian parliament passed the Language Act, which designated
Estonian as the national language and required facility in it for public and
private employment, and the Local Councils Election Act, which, inter alia,
made proficiency in Estonian a voting qualification. These national decisions
restricting minority rights placed Estonia in conflict with international
organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and
the European Union, which exerted pressure on the nation to revise its domestic
legislation.
Maveety and Grosskopf credit the Supreme Court with breaking the
impasse on minority language rights. In 1998, the Court issued two cautious
rulings on minority rights, relying on "technical rather than value-based

121. Id.
122. Maveety & Grosskopf, supra note 64, at 464.

450

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 38: 423

arguments in deciding the cases."l23 However, the decisions also contained
carefully worded hints as to the potential constitutional implications of the
measures, invoking significant principles from European jurisprudence. Thus,
while the Court returned the challenged legislation to the parliament purely on
procedural grounds, it provided substantive guidance that ultimately was
adopted, although reluctantly, as the acts were revised. The Court's "recasting
of international constraints-and national, nationalistic constraints-into a
debate about constitutional power reconstituted the choice context of the
legislature in such a way as to present obeisance to international standards as
nationally acceptable."1 24
Comparative citation aids in the process Maveety and Grosskopf
describe. By referencing the practice of other nations following similar
international norms, courts can give meaning to domestic constitutional
principles in ways that help legitimate unpopular outcomes. Moreover, even
speaking in terms that outside observers understand, as the Estonian Supreme
Court did in referencing the European concepts of proportionality and
relevance, may help to buy time for domestic deliberation by signaling to the
international community that its concerns are registering domestically.
While the Estonian language restrictions appear to have had majoritarian
support domestically, in other cases a small but influential minority may make
harmonization politically challenging. Through drawing national and
international parallels, courts can provide additional justification for
controversial legislative initiatives in ways that diffuse these political pressures.
An example, again from the Ugandan context, might be the recent outlawing of
the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). After the constitutionality of
the practice was challenged in court, the Parliament of Uganda criminalized the
practice, despite concerns among some members that this action would provoke
a backlash among village elders deeply committed to its continuation.125 The
Constitutional Court thereafter declared FGM unconstitutional, finding that the
practice violates Uganda's constitutional commitments under international law.
In reaching this holding, the Court relied most heavily on a nonbinding U.N.
statement on the elimination of FGM as persuasive evidence both of the
medical problems with the practice and of the international consensus against
its continued use in light of "well-established human rights principles."1 26 Thus,
the Court's reliance on foreign practice helped to provide cover for a
controversial domestic legislative initiative.127

123. Id. at 477.
124. Id. at 476
125. Wambi Michael, Female CircumcisionsStill a Vote Winner, INTER PRESS SERV. (Oct. 19,
2009), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48915 (discussing the political challenge posed by enacting
national legislation banning female genital mutilation).
126. The court's reliance on international human rights principles was reported as a basis for its
decision in the Ugandan press. See Court Outlaws Female Genital Mutilation, ALLAFRICA: NEW VISION
(July 29, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201007290467.html.
127. While the practice of FGM has not ended in Uganda, there has been no reported backlash
against the Parliament for its action. International agencies have praised Uganda for its initiative and are
now working on educational programs to maximize the impact of the legislation. See Brenda Asiimwe,
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Both of these examples demonstrate ways in which the judiciary can
translate international norms into domestic law in ways that are more palatable
to domestic audiences. At some point, however, international pressures may
require policy changes so counter to domestic desires-or so politically
impossible to implement-that adopting them fundamentally undermines the
authority and credibility of domestic power structures. In these cases, courts
may offer a way of resisting internationally imposed demands by relying on the
language of other broadly accepted international norms.
2.

ForeignCitation as Resistance

Because of their relative insulation, courts may be better positioned to
legitimate a posture of resistance than the elected branches. The international
norm acknowledging the importance of judicial independence means that these
actors are unlikely to be the subjects of direct international coercion in the way
that the elected branches are. Moreover, the judiciary may draw on the practice
of comparative citation as a way of challenging international actors on their
own terms. Through carefully drafted opinions, jurists may express the conflict
not only as national versus international, but also as between international legal
commitments.
For example, some courts have drawn on international human rights
principles-either directly or as expressed in the jurisprudence of other national
courts-to reject pressures toward economic harmonization. The Hungarian
Constitutional Court rejected as unconstitutional some of the austerity measures
imposed by the elected branches in response to pressure from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).128 It legitimated these decisions, in part, by drawing on
the jurisprudence of other European constitutional courts. 129 The Supreme
Court of India has also relied extensively on international law norms to develop
a robust constitutional protection against environmental degradation-a
protection that can now be invoked to resist claims based on trade law or
treaties. 130 In these cases, domestic courts may be raising broad international
human rights principles to resist the pressures of globalization in a way that
draws in other international actors (like environmental advocates) as allies, and
U.N. Agencies Join Hands to Fight FGM, NEW VISION (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.newvision.co.ug
/D/8/13/745703. And Uganda is encouraging a regional initiative against FGM to prevent women from
crossing national borders in order to engage in the practice. See Taddeo Bwambale, Uganda Calls for
Regional FightAgainst FGM, NEW VISION (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/741155.
128. Kim Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1941-42
(2004).
129. Liszl6 S61yom, Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Hungary, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1, 37. (Ldszl6 S61yom & Georg Brunner eds., 2000).
130. Benvenisti points to the decision of the High Court of Madras in Novartis AG v. Union of
India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (Madras H.C.), in which it refused to adjudicate the company's claims that
India's revised patent laws violated the nation's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement "as a possible
harbinger of this trend." Benvenisti, supra note 37, at 268. The court's "seemingly technical reasoning"
in dismissing the suit based on venue, "did hint at the underlying concern, the constitutional right to
health: at stake was the patentability of Gleevee, a life-saving drug for leukemia patients, and the
continued supply of the much cheaper generic version by Indian companies to patients in India and other
developing countries." Id.
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community must publicly address and

ForeignCitation: MediatingAcceptance and Resistance

More frequently, perhaps, the domestic path will be one both of
acceptance and resistance. Because it is generally not the institution responsible
for actual implementation, the judiciary is well situated to mediate these
pressures in ways that maintain the credibility of the domestic regime for both
internal and external audiences. The South African Constitutional Court's
decision in Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom offers an
example of this kind of balancing.' 31 The case involved a constitutional
challenge brought by a homeless community to their local municipality's
refusal to provide them with temporary shelter. Amici curiae in the case argued
that the Court should adopt the substantive standard of review provided by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, an instrument
South Africa has not yet ratified.132 The Court acknowledged the position of the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
interprets the Covenant to require state parties to devote all resources at their
disposal, first, to satisfy the "minimum core content" of the right to adequate
housing.133 The Court suggested, however, that it was institutionally illpositioned to define the "minimum core content" of the right in the South
African context.134 It concluded instead that the measures taken by the State
must be "reasonable," and that in this situation, they were not. 35
The Grootboom decision thus represents a careful balance between
broadly accepted international human rights standards and domestic political
realities. While engaging with and acknowledging the international norm, the
Court ultimately deferred to the political branches in the first instance to set the
priorities of the national housing program. In so doing, the Court
communicated the national commitment to meeting internationally recognized
socioeconomic standards, but also validated the primacy of the domestic
democratic process in making policy determinations for the nation. 36
4.

ForeignCitation: Co-option

The efficacy of foreign citation as a tool of diagonal accountability
depends on the norms that its audiences are willing to reinforce. These last
examples demonstrate how foreign citation may help courts mobilize support in
ways that protect judicial independence, democratic accountability, and
legitimacy. In some countries and moments, however, the norms that

131. South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
132. Brief for Human Rights Commission of South Africa and Community Law Centre as
Amici Curiae, South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), IT 16-29 (S. Afr.).
133. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 29-33.
134. Id.T!32-33.
135. Id. T 54, 67-69.
136. Id.TT41-43.
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international audiences are willing to reinforce may run counter to domestic
preferences. Tamir Moustafa argues that in Egypt the regime created
independent courts as a way of demonstrating to foreign investors that private
property rights would be respected, even against claims made by the State.1 37
Moustafa explains that the Supreme Constitutional Court then used this space
to create protections for domestic civil and political rights.
It is at least
possible, however, to envision a scenario in which judges would choose to
protect their personal and institutional interests by aligning entirely with
powerful foreign investors. This could translate into court decisions limiting the
government's ability to regulate private economic activity, thus preventing the
elected branches from responding to domestic demands for labor or
environmental protections. While this particular threat seems somewhat
unlikely to materialize given recent trends in international investment law,139
the example illustrates the risk that a particular international interest might be
able to "capture" the judiciary and undermine domestic democratic processes.
While theoretically possible, the strategic account suggests that this
outcome is relatively unlikely. As the preceding discussion demonstrates,1 40
power dynamics in new and hybrid democracies are characterized, first and
foremost, by uncertainty. Shifting interests and allegiances, both domestically
and internationally, mean that it will rarely be in the best interests of the
judiciary to be transparently and fully aligned with a single international
constituency-no matter how powerful. Rather, judicial self-interest is better
served by maintaining support amongst a broad coalition of domestic and
international actors.
In sum, this Part has argued that comparative citation can aid in diagonal
accountability because it allows for courts to mediate conflicts between
domestic and international audiences in ways that build the credibility of new
democratic institutions. And, for courts acting strategically to preserve their
own autonomy and legitimacy, comparative citation represents a unique and
effective tool.
V.

LESSONS FOR THE DEBATE

This institutional account of the practice of comparative citation sheds a
very different light on the study and critique of the practice. This Part examines

137. See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The
Judicializationof Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN

REGIMES 132 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
138. Id. at 149 (describing Supreme Constitutional Court rulings reforming the electoral system
and protecting the freedom of the press).
139. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy ofInternationalInvestment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 472 (2009) ("[1]nvestment treaties
have proliferated to an unprecedented degree, having surged from less than 400 in 1989 to well over
2,500 bilateral, regional, and sectoral treaties today."); Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State
Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196, 200 (2012) ("The past decade
has witnessed a well-documented growth spurt of intemational investment arbitration."). The growing
availability of private investment arbitration is likely to further weaken investor interest in the
jurisprudence of domestic courts since more of these disputes will be resolved outside of them.
140. See supra Section I.B.
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what the strategic account has to offer in the way of understanding the current
debate, both as to nations in transition and to the United States.
A.

Reconsidering the Antidemocratic Critique

Viewed in this political and institutional context, the antidemocratic
critique that has permeated much of the existing literature on foreign citation
becomes problematic for three reasons. First, the appropriate role for the
judiciary is much less understood in countries where the legitimacy and
efficacy of the elected branches is questionable. Second, these countries have a
much different relationship with international and foreign law, both because of
their constitutional commitments, and, more meaningfully, because of their
tenuous position on the international stage and their more pressing need for
international support. Finally, judges in these countries lack the institutional
protections available to judiciaries in more established regimes, and thus must
rely on different strategies to create and protect themselves and their institution.
Thus, the relationship between accountability and independence in these courts
is different than the one assumed in the U.S. context. Rather than viewing them
in tension, or as different sides of the same coin,141 in transitional regimes,
accountability and independence may be reinforcing, as courts try to protect
themselves from horizontal attacks by building a base of popular support.142
The problem in these transitional democracies is therefore not one of
overly independent federal judges and Justices, stepping outside of their
constitutionally delegated roles to override the more accountable branches in
order to impose their own preferences in individual cases. Rather, this is a story
of judges under tremendous internal and external pressures mediating a very
complicated system of transnational checks and balances through "the language
of foreign and international law," 43 with the goal of protecting and preserving
the new institutions of democracy. The strategic explanation of foreign citation,
thus, turns the antidemocratic critique on its head. Foreign citation may be
enabling judges and Justices in transitional democracies to play a crucial role in
building and maintaining the pathways of diagonal accountability among new
governmental institutions. To the extent these efforts are successful, the
practice is actually contributing to democratic consolidation (or at least, as the
Ugandan example suggests, in democratic preservation).
B.

Reconsidering the Methodological Critiques

This account also problematizes the study of foreign citation within the
context of individual case outcomes. While most comprehensive comparative
studies tend to look at how courts use foreign and comparative citation in

141.

Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 14-15 (Stephen

B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
142. Interestingly, this may mean that the problem is one of majoritarianism by the courts,
rather than the reverse.
143. See Benvenisti, supra note 37, at 271.
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individual cases and interpret their usage in light of these outcomes,'" this
study suggests that this kind of parsing may miss important big-picture
conclusions about the practice.
This is not to suggest that methodology is irrelevant; rather, these
critiques should be considered in light of the systemic function of the practice.
For example, one of the major criticisms in the U.S. context has been that the
Court is engaged in "cherry-picking" or "nose-counting."1 45 The cherry-picking
charge suggests that the Court is not truly considering the collective wisdom of
the world experience in its comparative scan, but rather is selectively picking
those jurisdictions that support its desired outcome. A variation on this critique
accuses the Court of "nose-counting." Ernest Young suggests that decisions
like Roper v. Simmons cite foreign law not for their reasoning, but rather to
increase the "denominator" of jurisdictions that reject a certain practice (like
the juvenile death penalty) in order to make clear that the challenged U.S.
practice is an outlier.146
If the strategic account is accurate, then these concerns may be less
applicable in countries in transition because the purpose of the citations is at
least as much about signaling as it is about outcomes. The selection of
comparators indicates to both domestic and international audiences that the
court is joining a particular community of respected or similar actors. 4 7 And it
may simultaneously suggest to those national or international courts a
commitment to their core principles.
These decisions may be both pragmatic and political. Jorg Fedtke has
described this calculus in the context of the Iraqi constitution-drafting process:
[P]urely political reasons did not make the American model (despite its
undisputable qualities) 'an ideal' choice in the search for inspiration. The German
and South African variations did, on the other hand, offer intriguing and (more
importantly) politically acceptable possibilities to an emerging nation desperately
trying to come to grips with a model of federalism and human rights protection
which best suits its troubled realities.'48

While his account focuses on the concerns surrounding the constitutional
commitment, these same factors likely inform the process of judicial borrowing
as well.

144. See, e.g., Foster, supranote 3, at 126-30.
145. See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? TransnationalJudicial
Conversationson ConstitutionalRights, 20 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 507 (2000).
146. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARv. L. REv. 148,
153 (2005).

147. In other words, as Aharon Barak said in response to the cherry-picking critique: "What's
wrong with looking out over a crowd and picking out friends? Should I look out over the crowd and pick
out my enemies?" Aharon Barak, President, Israeli Supreme Court, Address to Students at Yale Law
School (Sept. 20, 2007) (quoted in Harold Hongju Koh & William Michael Traenor, Keynote Address: A
Community of Reason and Rights, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 583, 586 (2008)). The African cases that I have
studied, for example, generally tend to draw upon the jurisprudence of the established liberal
democracies of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, together with the jurisprudence of other
respected African courts.
148. See BASIL MARKESINIS & JORG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW
SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 171 (2006).
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The selection of comparators may also reflect a deeper cultural or
linguistic bond with a particular set of nations and, therefore, a greater
familiarity with their jurisprudence. Law and Chang's study of the Taiwanese
Constitutional Court suggests that "the most proximate cause of foreign law
usage ... is the educational and professional background of the []ustices."l 4 9
Likewise, Markesinis and Fedtke's analysis of the German influence on the
South African Constitutional Court emphasizes the close linguistic relationship
between Afrikaans and Germans (and the resulting professional opportunities
for South African academics) as a bridge facilitating the consideration of
German constitutional law. 50 These examples suggest that a court's choice of
sources can have significant contextual meaning that goes far beyond the
holding of a particular case. Furthermore, if the citation is viewed as more
about communicating legitimacy and less about determining outcomes, the
choice of appropriate references must be subject to a different set of evaluative
criteria. "Cherry-picking," therefore, may be a valid communicative strategy
rather than a cause for concern.
There may also be methodological concerns that are unique or more
relevant to the use of comparative citation in the transitional context. There is
the question of whether the strategic use of foreign citation detaches its
function from the outcome in particular cases in ways that are problematic.
While citation to "best practices" may have positive systemic effects, this may
come at the expense of individual cases and the parties that bring them.
Alternatively, the citation of foreign and international law may be rightsreducing, particularly in cases where new democracies' aspirational
constitutions seek to provide protections that exceed generally accepted
international practice. Jacob Foster has characterized the early decision of the
South Africa Constitutional Court in Du Plessis v. DeKlerk in these terms.' 5 In
this case, the Court was asked to consider the "horizontal" application of the
interim Constitution to a defamation suit against a newspaper. The majority
opinion made extensive reference to foreign law in rejecting the defendants'
invocation of the Constitution as a defense, finding that the Constitution
applied only to government action. In dissent, Justice Kriegler argued that the
unique constitutional context in which the Justices were operating negated the
relevance of foreign law to the case. He explained:
The Constitution promises an "open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality", a radical break with the "untold suffering and injustice" of the past. It
then lists and judicially safeguards the fundamental rights and freedoms necessary
to render those benefits attainable by all. No one familiar with the stark reality of
South Africa and the power relationships in its society can believe that protection of
the individual only against the state can possibly bring those benefits ....

149. Law & Chang, supra note 5, at 571.
150. See MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 148, at 88-89.
151. 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) (S. Afr.); see Foster, supra note 3, at 119-21. Of course Foster's
view of Du Plessis is not uncontroverted. Basil Markesinis and JOrg Fedtke contend that the Justices
were "fairly balanced in their use of foreign law" and note their sensitivity to the unique South African
context. MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 148, at 99, 97.
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I find it unnecessary to engage in a debate with my colleagues on the merits or
demerits of the approaches adopted by the courts in the United States, Canada or
Germany .... We do not operate under a constitution in which the avowed purpose
of the drafters was to place limitations on government control. Our Constitution
aims at establishing freedom and equality in a grossly disparate society.' 52

This is not an isolated example, of course. When the Bangladesh Supreme
Court was deciding challenges to various aspects of its "Emergency," the
Justices cited foreign precedents to legitimate aspects of the military takeover.
In Anti-Corruption Commission v. Nazmul Huda,153 the Court overturned a
High Court decision granting bail to a former state minister who, along with
much of the political opposition, had been incarcerated on corruption charges.
The Supreme Court held that the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007 make clear
that appellate courts may not grant bail with these cases and cited with approval
cases from the U.S. Supreme Court for the proposition that emergency
situations necessitate extreme legal measures.154 As Jackson
has cogently
55
judgment."
wise
of
guarantor
no
is
transnational
"The
stated:
And of course, courts may simply get it wrong. The use of comparative
constitutional law is tricky and even very conscientious courts err when
working across linguistic, historic, and cultural barriers.' 56 While this objection
has been raised in the U.S. debate, it may be a more salient concern for courts
that are relatively isolated for political or economic reasons, and thus may have
more difficulty getting a complete picture of the context in which a particular
foreign judgment operates.157
At the most extreme, international or comparative precedents might be
manipulated or misstated to try to place an international imprimatur on
152. Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC),
145, 147 (S. Afr.) (Kriegler, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
153. 37 CLC (AD) (2008) (Bangl.).
154. The Court wrote the following:
Legal history is replete with examples that extreme situations often demanded a nation to take
extreme legal measures .... [The] American Supreme Court approved without dissent such
powers decision in the case of Harabayashiv. United States (1943) that involved more than
one lac Americans who were expelled from their communities for disloyalty .... Suspension
of Constitutional rights had to be sanctioned by the Court during war time .... In India in
1975 though[] 9 High Courts [had] held writ petitions in the nature of habeas corpus was
maintainable during emergency, the Indian Supreme Court in ADM Jabalpurvs. Sukla AIR,
AIR 1976 (SC) 1207., held that no person has locus stadi to move any writ petition for
direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under MISA.
Id. 42.
155. JACKSON, supra note 82, at 284.
156. Moreover, even with a good grasp of the facts, "it is difficult to determine when a
comparison between one legal system's rules and another's is likely to be fruitful for any purpose other
than simply acquiring knowledge. Particular rules are inserted into complex legal systems and may not
travel well without their companions." Mark Tushnet, International Law and Constitutional
Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 507, 513 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
157. Rachel Rebouch6 has noted how this has informed (or misinformed) comparative abortion
jurisprudence. Rachel Rebouch6, Comparative Pragmatism, 72 MD. L. REv. 85, 107-23 (2012). Courts
tend to cite Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for an expansive understanding of women's right to
reproductive choice, without noting (or perhaps being aware of) the Court's subsequent case law and the
decisions of lower courts allowing for significant exceptions to that right. Rebouch6, supra.
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problematic decisional outcomes. Foster cites as an example the April 2009
decision by Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions, Moketedi Mpshe,
to drop criminal charges against Jacob Zuma, which he justified in international
terms. 58 This decision cleared the way for Zuma, the African National
Congress President, to become the President of South Africa. Mr. Mpshe relied
on cases from English courts in holding that political interference required the
prosecution to drop the charges, but as Foster explains it, the cited cases were
both "distinguishable on the facts and inconsistent with South African
precedent."' 5 9
This example of abuse demonstrates how the practice of comparative
citation may, somewhat easily, be used to mask, rather than expose, politically
motivated outcomes, but notably, this was not a court decision. Nor, in the
extensive literature on foreign citation, are there many noted flagrant
misrepresentations of foreign or international law by courts, although the
Bangladeshi decision in Anti-Corruption Commission may come close.' 6 This
perhaps makes sense. Most of the time, constrained courts need not make the
effort of justifying their decisionmaking in terms of international and
comparative law because their sources of authority come more directly from
their alignment with the elected branches.
Again, the problem in these cases is not really one of countermajoritarianism or domestic displacement.161 Nor, for the most part, is it unique
to the use of comparative citation (with the exception of the challenges
presented by comparative analysis). Rather, as I have suggested,162 these
cases-and the challenges they present-require the possibly uncomfortable
acknowledgement that courts are political institutions that may be less than
transparent, or even disingenuous, in their decisionmaking. Moreover, they
demonstrate that courts, like all institutions, have limitations that may shape
their decisionmaking in unfortunate ways. Nonetheless, to the extent that
international convergence on a norm actually increases the likelihood of its
"accuracy," 1 " the practice of foreign citation may have an overall positive

158. Foster, supra note 3, at 80.
159. Id. at 80, 115-18.
160. The Court did not misrepresent the holdings of these foreign cases, but it did fail to note
that both countries have long since repudiated them. See Anti-Corruption Commission, 37 CLC (AD).
161. In fact, the critique of these courts might be quite the opposite. Because of their reliance on
popular support, these courts may be overly accountable to domestic opinion and may be less likely to
issue counter-majoritarian decisions.
162. See supra Section II.D.
163. Theunis Roux makes the point that legal academics are uncomfortable, particularly in the
South African context, acknowledging that extraneous political factors exert any kind of influence at all
on the way judges make their decisions. Theunis Roux, Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource
Allocation in the South African ConstitutionalCourt, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE
ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEw DEMOCRACIES 66, 67 (Siri Gloppen et al. eds., 2004).

164. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131,
141 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 14346 (2005). These kinds of"epistemic claims assume that guidance to answers on open questions relevant
to constitutional judgment can be found in the accumulation of third party decision-making (like that of
juries or scientific communities) by multiple national legal systems." JACKSON, supra note 82, at 47.
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impact on the development of a functional indigenous legal culture and may
lead to "correct" results more of the time.
C.

Beyond Transition: Comparative Citation Continued

Without undermining the fundamental premise of this project, which is
that context matters, the strategic account of foreign citation in transitional
regimes may have something to contribute to the debate over the use of the
practice in more established democracies. As Eyal Benvenisti has noted, even
in these countries, domestic institutional weaknesses and international
pressures may undermine the ability of the elected branches to be responsive to
domestic demands.165 In response, courts may rely on comparative citation as a
way of mediating international and national conflicts, in a way that both builds
the autonomy and representative capacity of domestic institutions and protects
the spaces for potential democratic deliberations.
I referred earlier to the Supreme Court of India's environmental
jurisprudence of the 1990s as an example of diagonal accountability through
comparative citation.166 India was no longer a new democracy at this point;
nonetheless, it faced some of the same institutional challenges that characterize
nations in transition. Beginning in the late 1970s, following the end of the
"Emergency" and the collapse of the Congress Party, the Court arose as one of
the few remaining national institutions.167 Emboldened by the weakness of the
elected branches and cognizant of the atrocities committed during the
Emergency, the Supreme Court of India set about to bring national
constitutional standards in line with international norms, relying heavily on
both foreign and international law to frame and legitimate its
Although the Court's citation to foreign and international
decisionmaking.
law has declined since its early years,169 perhaps reflecting the strength and
stability of its own domestic jurisprudence, it still regularly looks abroad when
deciding path-breaking new cases in areas of second generation rights.
The Court emerged from the post-Emergency period as the most popular
and arguably most responsive branch of domestic government.170 It had also

165. See Benvenisti, supra note 37, at 273. Eyal Benvenisti explains the increasing prevalence
of foreign citation practice as a judicial "reaction to the delegation of governmental authority to formal
or informal international institutions and to the mounting economic pressures on governments and courts
to conform to global standards." Id. Through cooperation, in the form of reference and citation, he
suggests that judges and Justices from different national courts are resisting actions taken by the
legislative branches in response to global pressures. My thesis is less concerned with the existence of a
"dialogue," or cooperation, between judicial actors-the evidence of which is limited. See Tom
Ginsburg, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of InternationalLaw: A Reply to
Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1021, 1023-25 (2009); Law & Chang, supra
note 5, at 528-32.
166. See supranote 130 and accompanying text.
167. Smith, supra note 2, at 251-52.
168. Id. at 252-53.
169. See id. at 240-41.
170. It is not an exaggeration to say that the degree of respect and public confidence enjoyed by
the Supreme Court is not matched by many other institutions in the country. "The judiciary in India has
become the last refuge for the people and the future of the country will depend upon the fulfillment of
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become part of the judicial dialogue on important rights issues.' 7 1 The Court
has capitalized on its strength and popularity to position itself as an engine of
diagonal accountability in the nation. It has drawn on international standards in
decisions policing the actions of the other branches.172 Moreover, it has, in
some instances, set itself up as a check on the coercive international pressures
of globalization, protecting the space for a robust domestic discussion on
second-order rights that run counter to international economic pressures.
David Landau has written extensively on the activism of the Colombian
Constitutional Court under somewhat similar institutional conditions.' 74 Like
India, Colombia also has a lengthy history as a democracy, 175 but it was not
until 1991 that the country adopted a written constitution in response to the
widespread perception of governmental failure among the population. Because
of institutional weaknesses in the other branches,
the Constitutional Court

the high expectations reposed by the people in it." President Kocheril Raman Narayanan, Speech on the
Occasion of the Golden Jubilee Celebrations in the Supreme Court of India (Jan. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/487/487%20narayanan.htm.
171. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
191 (2003) (including the Supreme Court of India among the active participants in the global judicial
dialogue on rights). The Court's death penalty jurisprudence has been cited by both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996-97
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court of India has held that an appellate court, which
itself has authority to sentence, must take account of delay when deciding whether to impose a death
penalty.... A condemned prisoner may ask whether it is 'just and fair' to permit execution in instances
of '[p]rolonged delay."' (citing Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465, 470-71 (India));
State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1 79 (S. Afr.) ("To complete the picture, it should be
mentioned that long delays in carrying out the death sentence in particular cases have apparently been
held in India to be unjust and unfair to the prisoner, and in such circumstances the death sentence is
liable to be set aside." (citing Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 S.C.C. 678 (India); Daya Singh
Lahoria v. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 2 S.C.R. 462 (India)); Prakash Mani Sharma and Others on
Behalf of Forum for Protection of Public Interest (Pro Public) v. Prime Minister and Office of Council
of Minister and Others, Writ Petition No. 0065-wO-149 of 2065 BS (2008) (Nepal)); see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action as an InternationalHuman Rights Dialogue: Considered Opinion,
BROOKINGS REV., Winter 2000, at 2, 3 (discussing the Supreme Court of India's affirmative action
jurisprudence).
172. As Smith explains, the Court has issued decisions requiring the creation of a governmental
"watch dog" body to investigate allegations of public wrongdoing, increasing transparency in the
electoral system, and defining a broader right of information access-and in so doing, has regularly
referenced international principles and international law. Smith, supra note 2, at 258-59 (citing Vineet
Narayan v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 889 (India); Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568 (India); and Civil Writ Petition #7257 (1999) (Delhi H.C.)).
173. See Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, The Right to Life Is the Right to Food: People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others, 17 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 15, 15 (2010) ("In a notable
refusal to accept the negative effects of globalization upon access to basic nutrition for its poorest
populations ... the Supreme Court of India has established itself as a champion of food security and
committed itself to the realization of the right to food in India."). The Court has recently expanded the
ability of the domestic judiciary to review broad "public policy" challenges to foreign arbitral awards.
Dharmendra Rautray, India's Supreme Court Places New Hurdles on Enforcement of ForeignAwards:
Venture Global and the Cases Leading up to It, 64 DisP. RESOL. J. 80, 81 (2009). This trend is not
uniform, however. See Upendra Baxi, Access to Justice in a GlobalisedEconomy: Some Reflections, in
GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME 27, 28 (India Law Inst. ed., 2007) (discussing decisions of the Court that
made Indian law more open to free market globalization).
174. Landau, supra note 29, at 321 ("[T]he Colombian Constitutional Court has viewed these
political conditions as a license to become perhaps the most activist court in the world.").
175. See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF
ITSELF 201-48 (1993).
176. Landau, supranote 29, at 322.
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has taken a leadership role in many significant issues of domestic policy. Its
continued responsiveness to the pressing challenges facing Colombia's
citizenry has made it a popular institution domestically,'77 and its creative and
thoughtful efforts to interpret the Constitution's guarantees within the context
of international and foreign law have earned it an international reputation for
creative rights-enhancing jurisprudence.178 Like the Supreme Court of India,
the Colombian Constitutional Court has been able to leverage its domestic and
international status to protect itself from unfriendly political elites179 and to
create space for domestic policymaking to occur in the face of international
pressures. For example, during the mortgage crisis of the late 1990s, the Court
stepped into the void created by the president's preoccupation with
"international calls for fiscal austerity" and legislature's dysfunction to help
craft a housing policy that, while flawed, "was very popular and ... kept most
homeowners in their homes."' 80 Notably, the executive branch ultimately
drafted the legislation-but the Court's efforts helped to create the space for a
response by the legislative branch in the face of international pressures.
Even democratic institutions in the United States are not entirely immune
to the harmonization demands of globalization. For example, the United States
is increasingly out of sync with the international community in its commitment
to the continued exercise of the death penalty. 18 This damages the nation's

177. Id. at 322 (noting the Court's institutional popularity); see also id. at 374 ("[D]ecisions like
the mortgage interest case suggest that the Court is doing a better job than either of the other branches in
responding to a popular outcry. Unlike in the United States ... in Colombia, the Court itself appears to
best reflect popular visions of constitutional transformation.").
178. The Court has issued landmark decisions on a variety of issues, including abortion,
euthanasia, and healthcare, that have established it as an international leader on issues of human rights.
For example, in 2006 the Court struck down a law banning all abortions as unconstitutional, relying on
international and foreign law to shape the domestic constitutional protections. In a lengthy discussion,
the Court described the trajectory towards international recognition of the full equality of women and
then discussed the relationship between reproductive rights and the realization of these goals. The Court
referred both to the international human rights treaties to which the nation is a party, including the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the ICCPR, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, but also to the decisions from the constitutional courts of the
United States, Germany, and Spain. For translated excerpts from the decisions, see Excerpts of the
Constitutional Court's Ruling That Liberalized Abortion in Colombia, WOMEN'S LINK WORLDWIDE
(2007), http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/pdf pubs/pubc3552006.pdf.
179. Landau, supranote 29, at 374.
180. Id. at 320; see also Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of
Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1669, 1690 (2011)
(discussing the Court's activism in the 1990s and a 1999 decision in which the Court replaced the
national system of housing finance with one that it had largely created itself).
181. "Beginning in the late 1980s, supranational and national tribunals began to consider the
legality of various aspects of the death penalty, taking as their starting point the prohibition on cruel or
inhuman punishment (a prohibition commonly found in both domestic and international legal sources)."
Melissa A. Waters, Judicial Dialogue in Roper: Signaling the Court's Emergence as a Transnational
Legal Actor?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 523, 524 (David L. Sloss et al.
eds., 2011) (citing Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
JudicialDialogue in Creating and Enforcing InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 507-16 (2005)). By
the time the twentieth century came to a close, "the United States stood entirely alone as the only
Western industrialized nation still to retain the death penalty." Mark Warren, Death, Dissent and
Diplomacy: The U.S. Death Penalty as an Obstacle to ForeignRelations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
309, 313 (2004).
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international image,182 and its ability to cooperate on a host of issues, including
perhaps most significantly, counterterrorism and national security.1
Yet changing the law of the death penalty domestically to reconcile its
conflict with our foreign relations is complicated. Our federalist structure
bifurcates these responsibilities, placing the exercise of the death penalty
primarily with the states, while control over international relations lies with the
federal government. t 8 The deep commitment of a few states' citizenry to the
practice of the death penalty means that opposing it carries a significant
political cost, even with respect to practices opposed by the vast majority of the
U.S. population, like the juvenile death penalty. By the time the Supreme Court
reversed its sixteen-year-old opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky and barred the
execution of persons whose crimes were committed prior to their eighteenth
birthday, they were "abolish[ing] a practice that had pretty much died out on its
own."185 Only two states, Virginia and Texas, continued to execute juvenile
offenders on a regular basis, and they "accounted for over 75 percent of all
182. As a former United States Ambassador to France put it:
[N]o single issue evoked as much passion and as much protest as executions in the United
States. Repeated protests in front of the embassy in Paris, protests at our consulates and, just
recently, a petition signed by 500,000 French men and women delivered to our embassy in
Paris were part of a constant refrain.
Felix G. Rohaytn, America's Deadly Image, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2001, at A23. The extent of the
international approbation, brought on by the United States' practice of capital punishment, changed the
ambassador's personal position. He explained his support for a moratorium by reasoning that "[s]ome
300 million of our closest allies think capital punishment is cruel and unusual and it might be
worthwhile to give it some further thought." Id. In 2001, a group of former U.S. diplomats filed an
amicus brief opposing the execution of the mentally retarded, arguing that continuing the practice would
"strain diplomatic relations with close American allies, provide diplomatic ammunition to countries with
demonstrably worse human rights records, increase U.S. diplomatic isolation, and impair other United
States foreign policy interests." Brief for Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 7-9, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727). In 2001, as a result
of its continued execution of juvenile offenders, the United States lost its seat on the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights.
183. The Austrian government delayed signing a new extradition treaty with the United States
due to concerns that the death penalty might be imposed in those cases, despite treaty law and
assurances to the contrary. See Warren, supra note 18 1, at 326 (citing Press Release, Austrian Press and
Information Service, Extradition Treaty Between Austria and the United States (Jan. 8, 1998) (on file
with author)). The European Union did likewise. See id. at 335 (citing Agreement on Extradition
Between the United States of America and the European Union art. 13, U.S.-E.U., June 25, 2003, 43
I.L.M. 749). Negotiations with the Australian government over placing sky marshals on flights between
the countries stalled when the U.S. government refused to promise that no Australians arrested onboard
one of these flights would face the death penalty for any offense. Id. at 326 (citing One Point Holds Up
Sky Patrol, AUSTL. ASSOc. PREss, Feb. 1, 2004, http://www.news.com.au/common/storypage/0,4057,8
561647%255E2,00.html). The execution of a Mexican citizen denied his consular rights prompted
President Vicente Fox to cancel a state visit with President George W. Bush. See id. at 327 (citing Press
Release, Office of the President of Mexico, President Fox Cancels Proposed Texas Tour in Repudiation
of the Execution of Javier Suarez Medina (Aug. 14, 2002) (on file with author), available at
http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/en/search/?contenido-3504&pagina=1 &palabras=Francisco+Javie+-Mayorga.
184. Perhaps nowhere has this conflict been more apparent than in the litigation surrounding the
United States' failure to meet its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Most
recently, the State of Texas executed Humberto Leal, a Mexican citizen whose Vienna Convention
rights were violated, over the objection of Obama Administration and despite the pleas of top military
leaders and State Department officials. See Ed Pilkington, US Politiciansand Lawyers Protest Against
Death Penaltyfor Mexican Man, GUARDIAN (London), Jun. 7, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world
/201 1/jun/07/us-texas-humberto-leal-execution.
185. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 52 (2007) (discussing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).

2013]

The Judicial Role in New Democracies

463

juvenile offender executions in the modem death penalty era.,,186 By contrast,
nationally, "over two-thirds of those asked opposed the juvenile death
penalty." 87 The continued use of the juvenile death penalty lacked national
majoritarian support, and came at a high cost for the United States
internationally.
The strategic use of foreign and international law in the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence may be helping to mediate this conflict between
international norms and domestic preferences. By carving out specifically
problematic applications of capital punishment as unconstitutional while
leaving the practice largely intact, the Supreme Court brings the United States
into compliance with international law norms in ways that would be politically
challenging for the elected branches, and that would likely be stymied, in any
event, by the federalist division of labor. Furthermore, by eliminating some of
these more extreme practices from U.S. law, the Court removes some of the
barriers to increased U.S. participation in other international legal regimes.
Finally, by acknowledging foreign and international law and practice in its
death penalty jurisprudence, the Court may actually be softening the conflict
between the domestic practice and the international norm in ways that protect a
space for the practice to continue. The Court's references to international and
comparative law signal to external observers that their concerns are not going
entirely ignored, even if the political branches are not (or cannot) be
responsive. In this way, the Court's incremental chipping away at the practice
can be seen as buying time for domestic deliberations around the use of the
death penalty to continue to occur.
The juvenile death penalty example is somewhat anomalous. On
relatively few issues is the United States so far outside the international
mainstream on an issue that ignites such widespread popular condemnation. I
raise it therefore only to demonstrate that even in an economically powerful
and well-established democracy, courts may be the institution best positioned
to respond to the powerful legal harmonization pressures of globalization-and
that they may do so in ways that further undermine the applicability of the
antidemocratic critique of foreign citation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Establishing the rule of law is a crucial step towards solidifying
democratic governance, yet it is also one of the most challenging. The existence

186. Id. at 52-53 (citing Victor L. Streib, Executing Juvenile Offenders: The Ultimate Denial of
Juvenile Justice, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 125-26 (2003)).
187. Id. A Gallup poll showed sixty-nine percent of those asked were against the death penalty
for juvenile offenders. Id. (citing Death Penalty, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Aug. 31, 2007 (on file with the
Duke Law Journal)).
188. For example, the preservation of the juvenile death penalty was a primary reason why the
United States has declined to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the human rights treaty
with the widest support internationally. See Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?:
A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 177 (2006).
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of independent courts poses a real threat to the regime in power, and thus
judges who defy the state are often sanctioned. Nonetheless, even in new and
hybrid democracies where institutional protections are weak, judges exhibit
unexpectedly independent behavior. This Article posits a theory for why judges
in newly or weakly democratic regimes engage in independent decisionmaking
and identifies comparative citation as a tool that allows them to do so
effectively. It thus builds upon and contributes to the growing literature that
identifies judges as agents of their own institutional development.
This Article also problematizes the "antidemocratic" critique of foreign
citation practice in both new and established democratic systems. When
domestic political failures converge with international pressures, comparative
citation can be a powerful tool for court-led diagonal accountability. To be
clear, I do not mean to suggest that it is only under these conditions that
comparative citation is appropriate. Numerous other authors have articulated
the educational and aspirational' 89 benefits of the foreign citation practice.
Rather, my focus here has been on contextualizing the "antidemocratic"
critique to demonstrate how fully it is premised on an idealized view of the way
democracy works-a vision that is never uniformly realized, even in the most
established democratic nations.
Like the international and foreign norms themselves, the antidemocratic
critique travels and its message is powerful. In January 2011, a Ugandan court
ordered a tabloid magazine to pay damages after it published a front-page
article including the photos and addresses of gay and lesbian Ugandans under
the banner "Hang Them." Citing foreign law, the court found that the tabloid's
conduct violated the subjects' rights to dignity and privacy.190 Later that same
year, former Ethics and Integrity State Minister James Nsaba Buturo, wrote an
op-ed column accusing Ugandans of "self-hatred." He attacked the adoption of
foreign and international human right norms in language that (while far more
pointed) resonates with the U.S. debate. He concluded his op-ed by suggesting
that
Our maturity as a nation will be assessed by the extent to which we are staunchly

189. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Foreword:A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 114 (2002) (critiquing the U.S. Supreme Court for "fail[ing] to
make use of an important source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more
creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different legal systems"); Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REv. 109,
118 (2005) ("Looking to foreign law may... enhance judicial decisionmaking by expanding
opportunities for ethical engagement with the views of those having equivalent responsibility and
aspiring to similar impartiality."); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative ConstitutionalLaw,
108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1309 (1999) ("We can learn from comparative constitutional experience ... just in
the way we learn from anything else. Thinking about that experience can be part of the ordinary liberal
education of thoughtful lawyers.").
190. Anthony Wesaka, Court Orders Tabloid To Pay Shs4.5m over Gays Story, DAILY
MONITOR, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/Nationall-/688334/1083838/-/cjdcliz/-/index.html.
The Rolling Stone tabloid magazine had published a front-page article that included the photos and
whereabouts of gay and lesbian Ugandans under a banner urging "Hang Them." Jeffrey Gettleman,
Ugandan Who Spoke Up for Gays Is Beaten to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/africa/28uganda.html. A few months later, gay rights
advocate David Kato was beaten death with a hammer in his own neighborhood. Id.
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patriotic and how much we truly shun practices and values that undermine our
integrity, development, unity and our nation's stability .... When our maturity is
not found wanting, at that point, other nations will respect us. Some of them may
even stop seeing our God-blessed nation as a dumping ground for their practices
and values which they are touting to be "human rights" but in reality are a threat to
our nation's viability and integrity.191

The charge that courts' foreign citation is undermining national
sovereignty or identity is powerful, particularly in post-colonial societies. It
may be used as a way to delegitimate and retaliate against courts that attempt to
limit state power.192 Given the important work that comparative citation can do
to promote democratic transition and consolidation, endorsing a narrative that
undermines it deprives courts of an important tool.
Viewed more broadly, this Article suggests the value of evaluating
comparative law through an institutional lens. We cannot accurately assess the
validity of judicial action without understanding what it is a court is trying to
do and why. This requires a closer and deeper look at the judiciary's
characteristics and its relationship with other domestic institutions. Moreover,
as this analysis has made plain, this kind of contextual view may not only
undermine the international applicability of American constitutional law
truisms, it may shed important light on their domestic application.

191. Nsaba Buturo, I FindIt Disturbing that We, Ugandans,Hate Ourselves, DAILY MONITOR,
Aug. 31, 2011, http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/-/689364/1227976/-/12s0twyz/-/index.html.
192. The judiciary in Singapore was also an "enthusiastic" participant in the global judicial
dialogue until, in a rather sudden reversal, it adopted an explicit "hands-off" policy to citing foreign
constitutional decisions. Arun Thiruvengadam attributes the change not to any reason articulated in a
court decision, but rather to a speech made by Singapore's Law Minister criticizing the use of foreign
precedents in a decision limiting the government's authority to detain citizens. Arun Thiruvengadam,
The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Cases in India and Singapore: Empirical Trends and
Theoretical Concerns 13 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Law Minister S.
Jayakumar argued:
[I]f we allow foreign case law and precedents to allow our courts to be involved in an
interventionist role, then we will have an untenable position .. .because our law on national
security matters will be governed by cases decided abroad, in countries where conditions are
totally different from ours.. .. if Singapore courts are allowed, because of all these foreign
precedents to review the discretion of the Executive on security matters . .. then Singapore
judges will in effect become responsible for and answerable to decisions affecting national
security of Singapore .. .. Our courts ... should not therefore be involved in the exercise of
these powers of detention.
Shortly after this speech, the judge who wrote the decision retired and was succeeded by a jurist who
rejected the use of foreign authority and who, perhaps not coincidentally, adopted a judicial philosophy
of extreme deference to the view of the elected branches in determining constitutional meaning. Id. at
16.

